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Abstract
Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA) is a Machine to Machine (M2M) communication stan-
dard, first released in 2008 as the evolution of OPC, created for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Internet of Things
(IoT) programming. It was designed to create an abstract model on which any information exchange in form of struc-
tured data can be implemented. Industry and state actors use it to control factories and plants thus putting OPC UA
dependent software in a critical security position. In December 2015, the German Federal Office for Information Security
proved that an official reference implementation of OPC UA contained security flaws in the code that could compromise,
if exploited, industrial machineries and other dependent systems [49]. Cyber attacks in ICS may be extremely expensive
because of the critical processes which they aim to stop.
This thesis proposes a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) based solution to monitor malicious computer attacks
on OPC UA. This work develops a plug-in for the dynamic Bro NIDS to support OPC UA based protocols, therefore
it creates an Application Programming Interface (API) that can be used to write Turing complete security policies in
the Bro language. Furthermore, policy scripts have been implemented to detect the exploitation of flaws and standard
inconsistencies found in the analysis [49]. In addition, the parser is also able to detect malformed packets, also sources
of attacks in general and those identified in [49]. The result has been tested and evaluated in efficiency, security and
standard coverage terms. The aim of this project is to suggest the use of an additional tool that might be used by
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) to investigate any attack and in order to safeguard OPC UA dependent
machines.
Preface
This master thesis tackles the problem of having a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) that supports the OPC UA
open standard (IEC 62541). Writing a NIDS from scratch would require too much time and therefore this work exploits
the powerful and extensible Bro NIDS. This work develops a plug-in for Bro, written in Binpac, to unleash Bro’s potent
policy script engine. Therefore allowing to actually develop Turing complete security policy scripts in the Bro language
to detect malicious actions in the traffic.
The introduction of this master thesis informs and discusses Industrial Control Systems (ICS), NIDS and OPC UA. These
topics are given respectively in sections 1.1, 1.3, 1.2. State of the art of the IEC 62541 open standard is discussed in
section 2.1.
An introduction to the potentiality of Bro NIDS is given in section 2.2. Furthermore, in part 2.3 is discussed Binpac,
a special compiler that allows to write application layer protocol parsers in the Domain Specific Language (DSL) also
named Binpac, to integrate OPC UA parsing in Bro. In the appendix D are listed the API that the plug-in provides. Data
structures used in the API instead, are listed in appendix C.
Design and implementation of the plug-in and policy scripts are in sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.1, respectively. Moreover,
the work develops few detection scripts to show the usefullness of the plug-in to identify attacks and deviations from
the standard in real-time (starting from section 3.2.4 to 3.2.7). The implemented parser has also the capability of
detecting malformed packets that are normally used during the run of fuzz testing or in outbreaks (section 3.2.8).
Finally, evaluation and conclusions of the work are provided respectively in sections 3.3 and 4.
ii
1 Introduction
This is the introduction section, in which disparate concepts are presented to the reader with the purpose of informing
him on topics and terminology that are discussed in this thesis.
1.1 Industrial Control System (ICS)
Industrial Control System (ICS) is a generic term that fundamentally identifies all the control systems used in industrial
production technologies. ICS was born with the digitalization of the industries but nowadays it includes a huge variety
of technologies such as: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS)
and other systems based on Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) [15].
ICS are typically employed in industry sectors such as electrical, water, oil, natural gas, chemical, transportation, food,
beverage, automotive, aerospace and others, although not all the applications are in the industry sector [15]. These
systems are usually critical to the normal functioning of industries and plants. Therefore, several components of the
modern society actually relay on them. Critical infrastructures control the distribution of electric energy among the other
things. If for some reason the current stops flowing in the region of a country, almost all the electric dependent activities
would immediately be compromised.
ICS technologies are extremely spread and fragmented because they have to cope with all the necessities of the wide
modern industry. There are hundreds of ICS protocols (i.e.: Profinet, Profibus, Modbus), classified by families and goals.
Most of them are proprietary protocols, that are not released to the public but to industry partners. Another example is
the S7comm, that is a proprietary protocol from Siemens that runs between PLCs systems [35]. Other protocols might
require the involved parties to buy the specifications, i.e., the Fieldbus family of protocols [19]. Furthermore, ICS systems
usually require a high efficiency, having real-time constraints [15]. Because of the specificity of ICS software, hardware,
its costs and constraints, it follows that ICSs are a huge branch of technology that is mostly handled by both, the private
sector and state actors [15].
Security in ICS
Security in ICS is a fundamental issue and basic guidelines have been defined in [15] by the National Institute of Standard
and Technology (NIST) based also on [43]. There is also an Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency Response Team
(ICS-CERT) [20] managed by the department of homeland security of the United States government. Their work aims
at reducing the risks related to all critical infrastructure sectors by cooperating with federal and intelligence agencies,
control system owners, operators and vendors. They provide alerts for those concerned with the current threats to critical
infrastructure networks and security advisories about the new vulnerabilities discovered in such systems. As of May 2017,
more than 50 security advisories have been published on the ICS-CERT website for the year 2017 [20]. This shows that
there are security researchers, penetration testers and auditors that are actively seeking for new flaws. The ICS-CERT
also provides other services: training to prepare professionals to the world of ICS.
ICS security is a delicate topic because of all the industry and critical infrastructure that depends on it and because
initially, ICS were different from information technology (IT) systems because of the typical isolation between them and
the rest of the IT network [15]. Nowadays instead, they are becoming more integrated into IT networks [15] for several
reasons. This change exposes them to more threats coming from both, the Internet and local networks.
Connecting computer devices to the network bring several benefits, i.e.: advantage of remote control, data collection,
real-time monitoring and other useful features but is also risky in security terms. Issues arise especially in embedded
devices because they usually run a custom firmware written in some low level programming language, likely C, tremen-
dously prone to errors. Moreover, embedded devices do not usually support the latest security features that are instead
supported on chipsets placed in conventional business laptops, desktop and server computers. The latest chipset’s security
feature that might be missing are: Supervisor Mode Access Protection (SMAP), Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention
(SMEP), Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Data Execution Prevention (DEP) [50]. These features re-
quire tight cooperation between the operating system and the hardware chipset. The lack of at least one of the cited
features represents the lack of a modern hardware/software adequate security protection mechanisms. Moreover, em-
bedded devices might not have a separation between user space and kernel space, running all the code with the same
ring privileges, therefore making SMAP and SMEP protections impossible to be implemented. This thesis will discuss
more about specific problems of embedded devices in section 2.1.2.
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ICS devices are delicate from a security perspective. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are usually easier to achieve than
outbreaks that get hold of the system. However, DoS attacks can already put at risk the manufacturing process if they hit
the production plant [62]. Therefore, ICS devices, parts of the critical infrastructure [15], have to be carefully designed,
developed and tested by companies and state actors. In a cyber war scenario it would be strategic to tear down the
enemies’ ICS production or the critical infrastructures’ stability by exploiting flaws in software implementations of OPC
UA or other ICS protocols.
1.2 Open Platform Communications (OPC)
Open Platform Communications (OPC), or Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) for Process Control (OPC) is a series
of standards specifications, developed with the collaboration of leading worldwide automation producers, working in
cooperation with Microsoft [26]. The name is taken by the fact that originally it was based on Microsoft’s OLE Component
Object Model (COM) and Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) [26]. The specifications defined a set of objects,
interfaces and methods to be used in product manufacturing and industry automation.
Several protocols have been developed as part of the OPC serie. DCOM based protocols standardized by OLE are: the
OPC Data Access protocol (OPC DA), the OPC Historical Data Access protocol (OPC HDA), OPC Alarm & Events protocol
(OPC AE) and OPC Commands protocols [26]. There is also a Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) based protocol,
OPC XML-DA, the first web service based OPC protocol [26].
Despite its advantages, the development of OPC is terminated, mainly because of its dependency to Microsoft based
technology. But there were also other bad aspects in OPC itself, as bad security and limitations on the information model
descriptive capacity. It does not provide the flexibility that it is needed in the current technologies [27] [30]. At its place
OPC Unified Architecture has been introduced.
OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA)
OLE for Process Control Unified Architecture (OPC UA), released in 2008 [33], is not just a protocol but a reinvention
of OPC itself. The OPC foundation defined a new information model which allows arbitrary data to be conveyed with it.
One of the most important features is that it is completely portable and therefore not bound anymore to Microsoft [27].
This new set of standards is referred with the IEC 62541 abbreviation.
OPC UA defines standards to allow the communication on devices (between different components of a machinery itself),
between machines and from machines to other IT systems, connecting IT and Operational Technology (OT) systems. In
addition, it is platform independent, i.e, OPC UA can be used from Windows, GNU/Linux, OSX and Android systems. It
can run on embedded devices, as well as on mobile devices and also on the cloud. OPC UA is supposed to be used on
local networks as well as on the Internet; therefore it provides secure tunnels for the connections [33].
Implementation of the standard at issue has already been widely integrated into industries like: automotive, beverages,
packaging, oil, automation and others because of its flexibility and extensibility [33].
OPC UA describes services on an abstract level, which can then be associated to different protocols. One of the most
important is OPC UA-TCP or “OPC Binary”. It is basically a binary encoding of the data transported upon a standard
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP) stack. OPC UA-TCP is mapped to port 4840 by the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) [18]. Then, there is a secure version of OPC UA-TCP that was called OPC UA-
Transport Layer Security (TLS) that is officially running on port 4843 [18].
The adoption by many industry companies of OPC UA is moving the ICS sector towards producing more Free and Open
Source Software (FOSS) [29][28][23].
Another important characteristic of OPC UA is that it is defined so generically and with enough flexibility so that it is also
supposed to be used with the Internet of Things (IoT) devices [32] [57]. Therefore, it gives interoperability between the
industry and the IoT, hence interconnecting these two different technologies.
Figure 1 shows an example of possible OPC UA architecture:
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Figure 1: OPC UA example architecture
The picture depicts an hypothetical usage scenario for OPC UA in which there are servers and clients distributed across
the Internet. IoT devices on the network can make use of OPC UA to share data between them and with other systems
thanks to the OPC UA’s implementations.
1.3 Network Intrusion Detection System
A Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) is a computer system, usually implemented in software, whose main role
is to detect attacks. Attack means every attempt to unauthorizedly undermine the stability of the Confidentiality, Integrity
and Availability (CIA) of the assets on the network [52]. Further goals of such a system are to react to the intrusions, for
example by notifying network administrators or others that such intrusions are happening and to record the associated
packets for further inspection [52]. Potentially a NIDS could also prevent the outbreak by dropping the malicious packets
before they reach the supposed destination. This can have side effects if the dropped packets are not malicious.
In a real-world scenario, usually, network intrusion detection systems are employed not as active packets filters but as
systems of analysis and research of new attack techniques [65]. These systems can be used to implement advanced
monitoring of the network traffic [53]. Ethical preserving purposes that might be achieved using modern NIDS are:
detecting intrusions and suspicious traffic for further inspection. Suspicious traffic means packets that violates some
defined security policies and/or packets whose structure differs from the expected one (malformed packet). Once new
attacks are detected, the exploited flaws can be studied by reproducing the outbreak while debugging the program to
understand what is/are the exploited bug(s). After the fixes are applied and deployed, a security advisory might be
published to inform customers, security researchers, etc, that a flaw was found and fixed.
The Bro NIDS can also be used to accomplish tasks such as several types of advanced network surveillance [61]. Network
monitoring software can be easily used to oversee on unencrypted network traffic. Nonetheless, most of the data users
send through the web, especially sensible data, are encrypted and secured by the Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure
(HTTPS) that uses trusted Certificate Authorities (CA) to build chains of trust to the sites’ certificates. However, some
messages, for example the Domain Name System (DNS) queries are still conveyed in clear text and that basically informs
network monitors of which servers are being contacted by whom in the network. However, even without DNS, network
monitors would still be able to know which servers the hosts are connecting to by making reverse DNS queries with the
server’s IP, that is encoded in plaintext in the headers of the IP packets.
NIDS usually run on some critical nodes on a network where all the traffic passes through, or they operate with a copy of
the packets in transit to avoid the risk to slowdown the network operations. However, a NIDS required to inspect all the
traffic of a network might not meet the performance requirements and it could get stuck because of resource exhaustion.
That is why it is important to have some experts that monitor and read the log of NIDS after successful installation.
The most advanced existing NIDS, up to the author’s knowledge are Bro[61] and Snort[63]. The last is a lightweight,
simple NIDS that does not really fit the scenario of this thesis because it misses the capability of Bro of stateful processing
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of the parsed information. Furthermore, Snort lacks a handly mechanism to extend its parser. If a new protocol needs to
be supported then the source code of Snort has to be adapted.
In the next two sections are presented brief descriptions of the core features and characteristics of the two presented
network intrusion detection systems, Bro and Snort, respectively in sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.1.
1.3.1 Snort
Snort is a signature based network intrusion detection system. These kind of NIDS are based on the concept of recognizing
particular packets through the so called “signatures” and then raise a warning if the packet matches. Therefore, Snort
allows to enforce security policies through static expressions applied on the content of the packets. Furthermore, it is
possible to program Snort using Berkley Software Distribution (BSD) packets filters to filter the traffic. Then, Snort
applies expressions to decide whether a packet has to raise an alert or not [63].
The idea behind signature based network intrusion detection systems is that using a significant description of a particular
cyber attack, it becomes possible to detect future outbreaks of that kind by checking for its signature (static expressions)
[63]. An evasion mechanism for signature based NIDS is i.e. when an attacker mutates the payload, the padding and
other components of his exploit to bypass the detection mechanism. Moreover, in a typical scenario, the “signatures” are
publicly available, as well as the NIDS source code. Therefore, an attacker can practice an attack until its success rate is
satisfactory, before using it against the target.
Snort however has been surpassed by Bro in terms of flexibility because the last supports more protocols, a plug-in
system for expanding its parsing capabilities and a security policy scripting engine to give statuful processing of the
packets’ content.
1.3.2 Bro
Bro is a hybrid network intrusion detection system. Bro’s project is being developed by an open communicaty. There is a
public mailing list in which people can communicate, ask questions, report bugs and discuss about documentations, etc.
Furthermore, there are many other projects regarding the development of additional features and tools for Bro. Last but
not least, Bro is very powerful, it already supports 52 network protocols [4] and it provides worthy means of expanding
and exploiting its current capabilities.
The official mailing list is the public mean of contact between the Bro’s users and developers. It is also the place where
people can ask questions, help, suggest improvements, report bugs, etc. The mailing list is also used to talk about the all
the projects under development. Moreover, proposals for changes from anybody are welcome if targeting specific issues
or with good motivation.
The main advantages of Bro over its competitor Snort, discussed in section 1.3.1, are two: first, Bro allows stateful, Turing
complete processing of the flowing packets, using a domain specific language similar to “C++”, called Bro, that has been
designed for that purpose [61]. And second, Bro allows to write plug-ins using a compiler for application layer protocol
parsers called Binpac (section 2.3). Therefore, developers can use Binpac to implement parsers for new protocols and
create high-level interfaces to allow policy scripts to process new protocols [64].
Bro is a hybrid system, signature and anomaly based. It abstracts the problem of parsing from the security policy
processing. The two operations are performed in two different steps using disparate instruments. The parser can be
implemented in Binpac, a language and compiler that has been created for that purpose. Binpac is further discussed in
section 2.3.
Bro might run on a cluster of servers that a company may dispose for it. In fact there is a project in development,
branched from Bro, called “Deep Cluster” that aims at building and controlling hierarchies of clusters with the purpose of
detecting intrusions, using the tool called “BroControl” [6]. This is not the classical scenario, but it has to be considered
because running Bro on powerful servers is probably the only way to process really big amounts of data, that might be
the output of networks with hundreds or thousands of active machines, like universities and big companies.
1.4 Problem Statement
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have been designed and developed since the digitalization of industries and critical
infrastructures [15]. In fact, the software behind those systems is mostly proprietary because developed by companies
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for other businesses or governments. Therefore, the public was never involved in the development on this critical slice of
technology as happened with other types of software. But as previously discussed, with the development and integration
of OPC UA, the possibilities to have a more open ICS in the future are increasing.
A possible observation of the state of the art NIDS technology for ICS is that most of the support is missing, especially for
protocols like OPC UA. But NIDS are very useful; they can reveal suspicious packets in real-time and alert the responsible
administrators. They are critical to detect attacks in real-time and for example inform the Computer Emergency Response
Team (CERT) responsible for the targeted systems. Therefore NIDS give a chance to the CERT to prevent future outbreaks
by investigating and fixing the identified issues and avert successful attacks from spreading on other systems by detaching
infected machines from the network. Moreover, recording and detecting attacks is advantageous to reproduce the attack
and to consequently understand which flaws the offender exploited. Once the vulnerabilities are known, they can be
fixed, future outbreak prevented and relative security advisories, eventually, published. As an example of the fact that
current NIDS has a very limited support for ICS protocols, it is possible to observe that the Bro NIDS only supports one
ICS protocol, Modbus [3].
The present work, hence, proposes to design and implement an extension for the Bro NIDS to parse and analyze protocols
created using the new, open standard named OPC UA, therefore improving the state of the art of NIDS in the contextes
of ICS and IoT.
The writing of a plug-in for the NIDS Bro to support OPC UA, implies implementing a high-level API that will be directly
interfaced to policy scripts. These will have the form of generated events that will be caught by Bro policy scripts. Any
developer will be able to use the plug-in described in this thesis to implement custom policy scripts, following the event
set provided as API and the relative data structures. Furthermore, the present thesis describes, implements and tests
detection techniques for real attacks, taking the examples from the security analysis of OPC UA steered by the German
government [49] to show the effectiveness of a NIDS in this context.
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2 State of the Art
In this section several state of the art regarding computer technologies are discussed. The current specification of the IEC
62541 standard, that is also known as OPC UA, first released in 2008 is discussed in 2.1. OPC UA is a service oriented,
platform independent architecture that integrates the old functionalities of OPC Classic’s specification in a new extensible
framework [33].
Bro NIDS and its policy scripting language are respectively in sections 2.2 and 2.2.3. The Binpac compiler for network
application layer protocol parsers is instead discussed in setion 2.3.
2.1 OPC UA
OPC UA, has been created and managed by the OPC foundation and it is an open standard rich of features. The following
lists have been taken from the official OPC foundation resources with the purpose of giving a clear and genuine overview
of the capabilities [33].
General OPC UA specification lines:
• Functional equivalence: all COM OPC Classic specifications are support by OPC UA
• Platform independence: from an embedded micro-controller to cloud-based infrastructure
• Secure: encryption, authentication, and auditing
• Extensible: ability to add new features without affecting existing applications
• Comprehensive information modeling: for defining complex information (i.e arbitrary data structures)
OPC UA functionalities:
• Discovery: find the availability of OPC Servers on local PCs and/or networks
• Address space: a hierarchy of data that can be browsed and utilized by OPC Clients
• Clients can read and write data based on access-permissions
• Subscriptions: monitor data and report-by-exception when values change based on a clientâA˘Z´s criteria
• Events: notify periodically or on changes of data to subscribed clients
• Methods: clients can execute programs, etc. based on methods defined on the server
Platform independence:
• Hardware platforms: traditional PC hardware, cloud-based servers, PLCs, micro-controllers (ARM etc.)
• Operating Systems: Microsoft Windows, Apple OSX, Android, or any distribution of Linux, etc.
Several security functions such as modern encryption and signature algorithms are provided to protect the CIA of the
relative data and systems.
• Transport: a TLS layer can be employed to provide security features
• Session Encryption: messages are transmitted securely at 128 or 256 bit encryption levels
• Message Signing: verify that the data integrity is preserved after the trasmission, detects tampering
• Sequenced Packets: exposure to message replay attacks is eliminated with sequencing
• Authentication: each UA client and server is identified through OpenSSL certificates providing control over which
applications and systems are permitted to connect with each other
• User Control: applications can require users to authenticate (login credentials, certificate, etc.) and can further
restrict and enhance their capabilities with access rights and address-space “views”
6
• Auditing: activities by user and/or system are logged providing an access audit trail
2.1.1 Overview
OPC UA Overview and Concepts is the first specification of the standard (IEC 62541) [44][45][46][47][48]. This section
is based on the information in [44].
OPC UA is applicable to components in all the industry domains, such as industrial sensors and actuators, control systems,
manufacturing systems, including the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) as well as Industrie 4.0. The standard defines a
common infrastructure model that OPC UA aware parties can use to exchange information. Essential components of the
system are:
• A model to represent the structures, behaviors and semantics
• A message model that the applications use to interact
• A communication model to convey information between end-points
• A conformance model to guarantee interoperability
In a typical OPC UA scenario, there could be a PLC that controls a machine by taking the input from the Human Machine
Interface (HMI), while, at the same time, it communicates with a back-end server with the purpose of, i.e., logging the
received commands. OPC UA facilitates the interoperability of disparate machines running different platforms.
In the OPC UA universe, various systems exchange information by sending request and response messages between clients
and servers or Network Messages between Publishers and Subscribers.
Data are transmitted using standard defined types and vendor defined types. Furthermore, the standard defines a set
of services that should be available in the client-server architecture. Clients can ask to servers to retrieve current and
past data. Servers can include Alarms & Events in responses, to inform clients. Additionally, through a concept called,
AddressSpace, the clients can query the servers for the metadata that describe the format of the data, therefore making
OPC UA format independent.
OPC UA’s servers can inform clients of new types with data types definitions dynamically. Additionally, a server can
provide multiple services to clients to integrate the distribution of data, alarms & events and history (past transmitted
data) from a single machine. As stated previously, the standard allows data to be conveyed in different composition,
between these are included the binary, XML and JSON formats.
IEC 62541 is flexible, in fact, disparate clients can get data from a server in different formats. A feasible scenario for
OPC UA is one in which there are several machines, some of which are actual ICS and requires a certain specific, maybe
proprietary format that can be conveyed with OPC UA, while other machines may be normal desktop computers, that are
there to control the machines and supervise the process. These machines ask for a different format, based on the support
of the implementation running on it (e.g JSON, XML)[44].
OPC UA also provides mechanisms for clients to quickly recover from communication failures without having to rely on
the timeouts provided by the underlying protocols. This is very important because ICS applications usually have real-time
constraints in the range of milliseconds [15].
A feature of the standard that gives to it a lot of flexibility is the fact that it has been designed to support a wide range
of servers. Characteristics of these servers are resources, like memory, disks space, CPU performances but also execution
platforms and functional capabilities. Therefore IEC 62541-7 defines Profiles to which servers may claim conformance.
Then, clients can discover the profiles of a server and based their interactions on the profile features[44].
OPC UA defines also a Publisher Subscriber model, in which it is possible to have the communications on a peer to peer
communication paradigm. Those transmissions might use UDP instead of TCP as support protocol. Such a scheme might
well suit scenarios in which there are small but frequent transmissions of data. For example, it is possible to have traffic
between PLC and PLC and HMIs. In such a scenario, peers are not even connected and do not need to know about the
existence of each other (using UDP). Therefore, UDP based transmissions may be point-to-point as well as multicast.
OPC UA servers can also stream data to applications residing on the cloud. That might be useful for applications like: big
data analytics, system optimizations and predictive maintenance.
7
The IEC 62541 standard is composed by disparate, independent, layers of specifications. Therefore, the core design is in-
dependent from the computing technology and the type of network transport. In this way OPC UA is autonomous respect
to the platform and the machine’s architecture. Furthermore, specifications’ independence from current technologies
will foster their porting in the future. Also, OPC UA is constructed so that the deprecated OPC COM clients are able to
upgrade to the current standard natively, or using external wrappers. In OPC, each OPC COM application has its own
address space model and set of services; OPC UA unifies the previous model by integrating the existing models therefore
giving backward compatibility and encouraging users to facilitate the upgrade of their systems.
The standard is defined so that it is possible to have more clients concurrently connected to more servers. Figure 2 depicts
a scenario in which more clients are connected to more servers.
Figure 2: OPC UA Client server architecture
OPC UA clients use client Application Program Interface (API) to send and receive OPC UA service requests and responses
to the OPC UA server.
Figure 3 describes the main internal components of an OPC UA server.
Figure 3: Internal OPC UA server structure [44]
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Real objects are physical or digital items accessible to the OPC UA server application. Examples of these include physical
devices [44]. I.e. an object could describe if a physical gate of a machine is open or not, and that might be required to
coordinate some other mechanical operation. In figure 3, it is also possible to observe that clients can make subscrip-
tions to servers, to get notifications regarding monitored objects. The address space instead represent the collection of
information that an OPC UA server makes available to clients [44].
From figure 3 it is possible to observe that subscriptions are part of the server application at runtime. A Subscription entity
is generated when a client subscribes to a server for one or more objects. After that, the server will send notifications
to that client, in the form of Publish Messages when it detects data modifications or when an event/alarm gets triggered
[44].
Figure 3 portraits the address space, that is composed by object nodes, that are accessible to clients through OPC UA
services. The nodes in the address space represent physical and virtual objects. A view instead is a subset of address
space that is of interest of a client.
OPC UA objects are of a dynamic structure (because new custom types can be defined and shared between hosts) and
objects also support cross referencing amid them. To implement object references, the standard defines a node reference
type, to allow objects to have relations in the address space.
Figure 4 depicts the object model in OPC UA, with variables, methods and events.
Figure 4: OPC UA object model [66]
ObjectType nodes provide types definitions, furthermore the OPC UA standard supports hierarchies of classes therefore
enabling the inheritance mechanism [44]. Then, industry groups need to define their own specific information models
in the OPC UA Server address space to implement their own custom protocols.
The surrounding client server architecture of the system is flexible. OPC UA servers can also be clients of other servers
(servents). One possible type of interaction between the two parties are request/response exchanges. It consists in a
client that send a message to a server, to perform a specific task on one or more nodes (objects) in the address space.
Possible types of requests imply actions like: browsing the nodes’ address space, read some node, write others, etc.
The other fundamental interaction is request/response exchange in the publisher-subscriber model. It is possible to
organize servers so that redundancy of the data is achieved by having servers that subscribe to others to receive updates
when the objects are modified and therefore mirroring the data [44]. But this is a just a feasible organization of the
servers and the ability to organize the data flow and to program the hosts is left to whom will implement the ICS system
using OPC UA.
Similarly, Peer to Peer (P2P) interactions can implement the publisher-subscriber model. In a P2P scenario, publishers
send messages to Message Oriented Middleware, that are hardware or software systems that support the sending and
receiving of messages between distributed systems [44]. There are basically two main variants of this publisher-subscriber
architecture:
• A simple version, in which the Message Oriented Middleware is the network architecture that is able to route
datagrams (routers, switches). Publisher and Subscribers then use UDP multicast to communicate [44].
• A broker based form, in which the Message Oriented Middleware is a broker server. Publishers and subscribers can
connect to the broker and apply to a specific queue, to publish or subscribe to it [44]. The same set of services
used for interaction in the client server architecture is also used in OPC UA P2P mode.
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In the last architecture, the interacting parties do not know the identities of each other. There is no connection estab-
lishment between publishers and subscribers [44]. The knowledge about who subscribed to which object is left to the
Message Oriented Middleware[44].
As previously described, the publisher-subscriber model can also coexist in a client server structure. OPC UA is a service
oriented architecture because OPC UA machines send requests to use services that are running on other peer machines
or servers. A client can discover which services a server is running by querying him for his Profile[44]. Some standard
services are:
• Discovery Service set, that allow clients to discover OPC UA servers and also disclose their security capabilities for
TLS negotiations [44]. Discovery services run on normal servers but also on dedicated ones [44]. The latter are
servers that have the main goal of informing the clients on the available services on the network.
• Secure Channel service set; it allows to establish secure channels between clients and servers to provide confiden-
tiality and integrity of the transmitted information [44].
• The Session Service set instead is used to establish application layer connection in the context of a session for a
specific user [44]. It is useful to set timeout values for the session as well as for validating that a service is being
access from a user that is authorized to, in a way that is also valid.
• The Node Management service set allows clients to add, modify, delete nodes in the address space.
• The View service set allows servers/clients to define subsets of the address space that is allowed to be accessed,
so they can discover existing nodes and navigate between their connections to explore the structure of the actual
view [44]. It is a service that restricts the range of operation of hosts, therefore it gives a mechanisms to manage
access control of the objects in the address space.
• Alternatively, the Query service set, allows clients to read nodes without the need to browse them but by specifying
the desired filtering criteria.
• The Attribute service set is used to read and write attribute values [44]. Attributes are primitive characteristics of
nodes in OPC UA’s address space [44].
• The Methods service set is defined in [46]. Clients should discover methods by browsing the available objects on
the server (methods are always components of objects [44]). Then, the clients can use the service at issue to
invoke the execution of a particular discovered method on the server side and return the result to the client. This
mechanism is very similar to Remote Procedure Call (RPC), used in a variety of systems and protocols. Also, some
methods might not be called concurrently [44].
• The Monitored Item service set allows clients to create and maintain monitored items. These might be: variables,
attributes or event notifiers [44]; whenever one of those values change, or when there are pending alarms or
events from the event notifier, a message is conveyed to the monitoring client to inform him. Monitored items also
specify the interval in which the values have to be sampled for detecting modifications. E.g., a PLC client could
monitor the state of a physical device e.g the state of a slider through the monitored item service set and decide
when to take action based on the update messages provided by a server that manages the slider.
• Finally, the Subscriber service set is used by clients to create and manage subscriptions. Once subscribed, clients
receive a notification message every periodic time lapse for each monitored item[44]. Once created, subscriptions
are independent from the client server temporary session. This makes them easy to use also in a P2P model.
Furthermore, to prevent non-use by client, the subscription has an expiration date, after which the client needs
to renew it[44]. Subscriptions also support the recovery of lost messages; each notification message contains a
sequence number that allows clients to detect if any message was missed.
Another important characteristic of the IEC 62541 standard is that it is also intended to be used as a bridge to fill the
existing communication gaps between legacy technologies and modern systems [31]. A common problem that can be
found in the industry is that the information flow between different levels of operation can not be easily implemented
without OPC UA. With IEC 62541, domain specific information models can be adopted, in combination with secure
communications, to assure seamless integration, of the different parts of the IT and OT systems [31].
Figure 5 depicts a possible industrial scenario in which OPC UA is used for interoperability.
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Figure 5: OPC UA provides industry standard interoperability [58]
2.1.2 OPC UA Security
Guidelines on how security should be handled during the implementation of an OPC UA specific system have been defined
in [45].
The second document of the IEC 62541 standard [45] presents several attacks and the protection against them. Potential
outbreak vectors are: eavesdropping, message spoofing, message reply, malformed messages, server profiling, that basi-
cally consists in an attacker probing a server to determine from his response the capabilities and configurations of it [45].
Protection against malformed messages have to be prevented by the developers that are in charge of handling security
in the specific implementation [45]. Spoofing is prevented by using signatures, or some other form of authentication,
on the transmitted messages. Reply attacks are prevented by having timestamps, sequence numbers and request ID for
each message[45]. If they mismatch, a correct server/client implementation should drop the connection [45]. Once
terminated, a client can re-establish a link with the server by reusing the previous session key, until it is not expired, then
the client will have to establish a new session [45].
As already discussed, OPC UA client and servers make use of sessions to keep stateful connections. A likely security
scenario has an attacker that tries to steal the session key of the client. This outbreak is also known as session hijacking.
In an industrial scenario, a successful attack of this kind would imply that an attacker can impersonate a client (e.g a
PLC) to a server machine. An attacker could therefore trigger unauthorized actions of unauthorizedly retrieve data. OPC
UA prevents this by providing secrecy on data (explained later in this section). The standard supports a broad range of
the most common algorithms for symmetric, asymmetric encryption and data hashing [45].
IEC 62541-2 distinguishes two disparate protocol layers that contribute to security. The classic Transport Security Layer
(TLS) and the OPC UA application layer [45]. The first one implements confidentiality, integrity and availability of the
data in transit, while in the OPC UA application layer are handled authentication and the OPC UA’s sessions related keys
(that are different from those in the TLS).
Figure 6 depicts the disparate security layers utilized to secure OPC UA.
In IEC 62541 there are different types of authentications that might take place through the application layer [45]:
• user authentication
• machine authentication
• application authentication
OPC UA applications use authentication to authenticate users to servers (while servers are authenticated to clients
through pre-installed/distributes by local CA certificates). Compromising user credentials is prevented by adopting
safe security policies for users’ password management and strong encryption for transmitted credentials [45]. This
does not take away the usual security practices employed for securing credentials such as: not writing or printing any
password on papers or electronic files unless encrypted and train emloyees on malicious actors’ techniques such as so-
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Figure 6: OPC UA security model [59]
cial engineering and how these mechanisms can be abused to gain information/control without authorization [45]. A
determined attacker might even use a “password cracking” tool to try to discover credentials.
Client applications send user identity tokens to authenticate their users. There are three types of tokens: username/-
password, an X509.3 certificate and a WS-SecurityToken [45]. If the user is using a digital certificate for authentication
then he will need to win the channel-response challenge generated by the server. As usual, in this scheme, the server
generate a nonce and provides a signing algorithm in response to a CreateSession request. The client have to prove that
he is the certificate owner by signing the nonce using the specificied signing algorithm and sending it back to the server
in a determined time interval [45].
X.509 certificates are the typology of certificates used to authenticate client applications to servers [45]. Different imple-
mentations in the application protocol stack might require certificates to authenticate the machine, the user and/or the
application [45].
Authorizations handling for access and control to services and objects in the network is delegated to the specific OPC UA
application’s developers. OPC UA already provides neat mechanisms to authenticate users, machines and applications.
On top of that, it is possible to build an authorization system, based on the verified identities of the applicant users. OPC
UA server respond with “Bad_UserAccessDenied” to indicate an authorization or authentication error as specified in [47].
An attacker might also simply try to stop the servers’ services by flooding it. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are critical
in ICS. If a machinery in an assembly chain stops working then the whole production chain is harmed. For availability
reasons, any server, always have to define a maximum number of concurrent possible connections [45]; this might be
exploited by an attacker that opens many concurrent connections to the target service and stop the original clients from
getting replies as expected. Servers should send an alert to the IT administrators if the maximum number of connections
is reached because then, the availability of the service is at risk [45].
Confidentiality is achieved by the use of asymmetric encryption for the key agreement, with pre-installed or safely
deployed certificates from a local CA, to verify the authenticity of the server’s signature. Instead, a symmetric-key
algorithm is used to secure the remaining messages that are required to be sent to the host with which the secure
communication has been established. Detailed encryption mechanisms are described in [48].
Integrity is verified using asymmetric signature and Message Authentication Code (MAC) verification. Asymmetrics
signatures are used during the key agreement phase. On all the other messages, MACs are used [45].
Auditability is supported by OPC UA by implementing trace logs that basically annotate all the activities of all the nodes
in the network. Note that the logging has to be implemented by the product producers. More details on auditing can be
found in [47].
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IEC 62541-2 clearly states that security is not a trivial problem to deal with and hence OPC UA software producers have to
make a risk analysis to estimate potential outbreak vectors and impacts. Then they have to prevent the identified possible
attacks by defining a set of security policies that will be used to prevent unauthorized access, alteration, or prevention
of access to the information and services the OPC UA systems provide to the network [45]. The document at issue also
acknowledge that a single layer of protection against attacks can not protect from all possible outbreaks [45]. Therefore,
the OPC UA standard part 2 [45], suggests the use of “defence-in-depth” as a security strategy. This scheme suggests
the use of firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems and control on media and devices introduced to the
computer network [45]. Specific system protections might consist in: operating system configuration hardening, security
patch management, anti-virus software installed and active [45]. Substantially, IEC 62541 defines security mechanisms
to integrate fully customizable security policies that will have to be designed and implemented for the specific OPC UA
application.
Several implementation specific security controls are specified in [45]. For example session timeouts can not be too big
because if a client stays idle for a long time but without resetting the session, the server would need to keep buffered
messages and other information related to him. This could lead to resource exhaustion [45]. Moreover, the OPC UA
standard specifies what have to be done when parsing well formed messages on the client or the server side. But it
does not include information about how malformed messages should be handled [45]. If not explicitly defined, the
implementation might continue to parse OPC UA deformed messages, potentially leading to vulnerabilities [45].
IEC 62541-4 defines error codes that have to be used to notify errors to clients. But error codes might introduce infor-
mation disclosure attack vectors as for example server profiling attempts. For this reason, IEC 62541-4 [47], states that a
single generic error has to be returned before and at the time of establishing a secure connection. After that, appropriate
error codes shoud be returned. Furthermore, part 4 of the standard also specifies that sockets have to be closed after an
error message is received. Therefore, vendors should make sure that all the paths that trigger the system call of closing
the network socket do not result in time based, information disclosure attacks launched by a potential network observer
[45]. Finally, the standard strongly encourages implementers in taking care of arrays and strings length and to control
deep recursions to evict undesired crashes [45].
Random Number Generation (RNG) is another issue related to security, especially for embedded systems. The documen-
tation discourage to make use of the rand() “C” standard function because it does not provide enough entropy [45]. As
an alternative it suggests the use of Microsoft Windows Crypto library (WinCrypt library) or OpenSSL [45]. However, on
embedded devices, there might still not be enough randomization. Normally, RNG functions initialize a generator based
on the instant time and other pieces of local information such as: hardware IDs, screen resolution, installed software,
user input, etc [45]. The trouble on embedded devices is that most of these information are missing because lacked
by design. All those devices are almost identical and not as various as a desktop computer where there is more space
for complexity and hence entropy. It follows that an attacker might guess an initial RNG configuration with few pieces
of information because of the poor fortuity capabilities of the embedded device [45]. In addition to that, the standard
suggest that security of embedded devices can be enhanced by adding hardware entropy generators when designing the
device. Otherwise, certificates should not be generated on embedded devices but created elsewhere and then imported
to them. For machines without entropy generators, it is helpful to store the Cryptographic Pseudo-Random Number
Generator (CPRNG) on persistent memory so that every boot will not produce the same random numbers [45].
OPC UA specifies that certain functions must be only performed by administrative users. An example of such a delicate
function are actions that manipulate certificates such as the possibility to update and revokate them. The capabilities of
administrators might vary from platform to platform. Different implementations might prefer a single administrator over
multiple administrators, or even having multiple layers of administrators with different capabilities is possible [45].
Multicast discovery is naturally a security issue because when a server of this type starts his activity, it broadcasts its
presence on the current subnetwork so that clients can acknowledge which servers are available and build lists of them
that they will later use to connect [45]. Rogue servers could be setup by attackers to inform of their presence and
consume network and system resources, or they could also try to impersonate the genuine servers [45]. These risks can
be mitigated by enabling the use of certificates for all the applications in scope.
IEC 62541 defines the concept of Global Discovery Server (GDS) to propose practical alternatives to weak multicast
discovery. A GDS is a special server that provides discovery services and, eventually, certificate management capabilities
for an entire plant or a whole industrial system [45]. The functionalities provided by such a type of server are several:
• Servers can register on the GDS
• Clients can query for available servers
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• Clients and servers can download certificates from the GDS
• GDS can push certificates to a server
• Several GDS can cooperate to build a final list of all the available servers
The influence of a GDS is proportional to the impact of a successful breach to it. After a fruitful outbreak to a GDS, an
attacker can easily subvert the whole network, or at least parts of it, because of the influence of the server. The presence
of rogue GDS has to be prevented, identified and terminated as soon as possible. The GDS might be targeted because of
his privileged control on the system by rogue clients and servers. If compromised, a GDS server allows an attacked to
manipulate security certificates deployed to clients and servers. Furthermore, rogue GDS might induce badly configured
servers to register with him and hence compromise the security certificates and therefore violate one or more of the
following properties: Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) of ongoing communications. More details about
GDS security can be found at [45].
Another issue to tackle in OPC UA implementations is the parsing of special messages, such as broadcast and multi-
address IP packets. Misinterpreting such special messages may lead to vulnerabilities [45]. Also, it is important to know
that OPC UA specifications do not provide rate control mechanisms but a custom implementation may take care of it
[45].
One more issue to face is certificate management. Normally, OPC UA applications are provisioned of application instance
certificates to provide application level security. As already discussed, these certificates are of the X.509 type [45]. These
are explained in detail in [47] and [48]. Note that certificates can be self-signed. But in that case, each application
will need to have a list of trusted public keys that represent the credible certificates. On the other hand certificates can
be signed by a Certificate Authority (CA) and then deployed to applications when requested [45]. The main difference
between self-signed and CA signed certificates is that with the first solution, the certificates have to be deployed somehow
by the developers, for example during system updates, or also by administrators that manually/remotely bind them with
the specific applications [45]. With CA support instead, certificates just need to be uploaded there and the CA will take
care of deploying them. The use of commercial CA companies is discouraged [45]. A local CA instead can be put in place
to handle the certificate management issue. Also, applications should be capable of handling Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRL) [45]. CRLs are lists of public keys that have been revoked from the system [45].
OPC UA security is a huge topic where several mistakes can be implemented on different layers of the system. Therefore,
extreme attention should be dedicated to it by: designers, developers, testers and auditors employed during and after
the construction of the systems. This can be achieved with the contribution of expert professionals as for example the
ICS-CERT [20], specialized companies and freelancers. As written in this section, the official specifications of OPC UA,
states that NIDS and other security specialized software and hardware can be put in place to enhance the level of security
and monitoring of the system.
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2.1.3 OPC UA implementations
There are several public implementations of IEC 62541 clients and servers [23]. These are developed by individuals as
well as by the OPC foundation [33]. Fundamentally, “C++” and “Python” clients and servers are available to the public.
The avilable software are mainly frameworks of the standard and to implement the specific applications, the work of OPC
UA applications’ developers is required. However, for example, it is possible to use a Graphical User Interface (GUI), free
software program [36], to manipulate objects on a remote server through read, write and other kind of requests. The
author used the software at issue to generate OPC UA packets to enrich the capabilities of the parser developed through
this document. Having traffic records files is fundamental in the development of a parser for the simple reason that
without them, the testing of the parser itself results impossible. Fortunately, in this case, the standard is open and the
author could use freely available implementations. Figure 7 shows the graphical user interface of the client at [36].
Figure 7: Sample window layout of opcua-client-gui [36]
The GUI is user friendly, the hierarchy of directories on the left shows the objects that the client can manipulate on the
server, then the folder types contains new types definitions and views consist of, as the name suggests, views. The right
panel instead encompass attributes and object references.
There are other implementations, also of libraries that support various OPC UA range of operation. However, in an
industrial scenario, there would be a company that want to implement a custom OPC UA based protocol for the purpose
of realizing a practical application in ICS or IoT. For example, it might be new machine for the assembly line of any
product that is industrially produced. In this example, the company at issue might use OPC UA and it could employ
enough developers to implement the application needed to control the machine. Therefore, the company has to deal
with the development of the related sofware, furthermore, note that at this stage of development is still possible to
introduce security issues, as discussed in section 2.1.2, if not enough attention is paid on the matter.
OPC UA is an open standard and this is the major reason because public official and unofficial reference implementations
are available [29] [28]. Furthermore, the available implementations on the Internet will be used by companies and people
that want to experiment or put in place a system based on OPC UA. By consequence, if the reference implementations
have bugs, the users’ of the software might suffer because of those. As showed by the federal office for information
security of the German government in the 2015, the software was actually flawed [49].
The importance of making real security risk assessments on reference implementations is a fundamental issue that is also
reason of this document. Having a network intrusion detection system that supports definition of arbitrary policies on
OPC UA is the goal of this project that will try to provide the presented functionalities to the maximum extent possible
because of limitations of time and resources.
There is also a Wireshark dissector from the OPC foundation, that is auto-generated code by a “C#” program whose
source is not public. That piece of code has been proved to contain bugs in the past [40]. Every piece of code related
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to OPC UA is of incredible importance in security terms. Flaws in the reference implementations as well as bugs in
Wireshark plug-ins expose their users. This is why during the evaluation process, section 3.3, it will be important to test
the robustness of the generated parser to greatest possible extent.
Other implementations of OPC UA clients and servers are available on the Internet, [25] and [38] are valid examples.
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2.1.4 OPC UA applications
Section 2.1 introduces the main characteristics of the IEC 62541 standard for building service oriented programs to
control ICS, IoT devices and also appliances utilized in critical infrastructures. Section 2.1.2 is instead oriented at giving
a description of the security features and issues that the OPC UA standard had to tackle and the mechanisms adopted to
provide effective solutions. Section 2.1.3, discusses some of the available implementations of the OPC UA standard. This
section is dedicated to the real world OPC UA applications in ICS, IoT and critical infrastructure devices.
OPC UA on field devices
To understand an example of context in which OPC UA has been integrated [54], the definition of field device is required.
Citing [12]: “At the foundation of any process are the field devices that measure and control the flow of air, steam, water,
gas or hundreds of other materials. Without proper basic setup, calibration and configuration of these devices, advanced
control techniques cannot provide the levels of efficiency the technology is capable of”. Substantially, the previous
definition identifies field devices as critical parts of automated physical processes because they control local operations
such as opening and closing of valves and switches, collection of data from sensors and raise of alerts in case the system
is in danger. The paper [54] represents a research that targeted the integration of existing technologies for hardware
design and implementation (the Electronic Device Descriptive Language (EDDL) and Field Device Tool (FDT)) with the
OPC UA standard to achieve functional integration of field devices with the IEC 62541 standard. The authors validated
the concept through the testing of a prototype that includes different field devices from process and factory automation.
In conclusion, the paper at [54] states that the achieved results are important for a united future of FDT and EDDL.
Furthermore, the results were presented at the Hanover fair in 2008.
Figure 8 depicts the information scheme modeled in [54] to integrate OPC UA with field devices technologies.
Figure 8: Architecture overview [54]
From figure 8 it is possible to note that the device description is composed by Device Information Model (DIM) and
Device Operation Model (DOM). The DIM represent a way to grant standard access to the device’s data, functions and
higher level applications like the DOM. In this context OPC UA is applied as a technology to interconnect different field
devices and make them cooperate as it is required by the specific industrial system.
OPC UA on smart grids
Another research published regarding the OPC UA integration is [51], in 2011. The paper focuses on the concept of
interoperability between smart grids. The latters are considered the future towards which the current power distribution
technologies are tending to, in several countries [51]. Power grids have several issues, one of which is that they must al-
ways provide enough power to satisfy all the grid’s users’ needs, otherwise low tension or blackouts might be experienced
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by the power grid’s users. The described issue implies wastage of power that is not consumed to keep the threshold high
enough and therefore the need for smart grids that can improve the precision and automation with which power grids
manage the actual current flow [51]. Among the contributions of [51], it is notable that the authors implemented OPC
UA applications to simulate the forecasting of the power consumption of a virtual grid. The simulation has been ran on
a single machine but the authors have been positive on the idea of integrating OPC UA with real world smart grids.
OPC UA on IoT devices
OPC UA has also been designed and implemented to support the IoT devices [44]. In fact, the paper at [32] discusses
exactly the feasibility of integrating OPC UA with IoT devices. The document supports the idea that the scalability and
the flexibility OPC UA makes it a suitable technology to support low powered, minimal resources IoT devices. Indeed,
OPC UA defines a “Nano embedded device” server profile that it is intended to be used with chip level devices with very
limited resources [32]. The server profile at issue is functionally equivalent to the core server and it defines OPC UA TCP
binary as transport protocol [32]. The authors of [32] experimented the execution of the OPC UA server on a machine
with a single chip solution, the TPS-1 (ARM9@100MHz), with less than 64KB of RAM [32].
Figure 9 depicts the architecture of the described IoT device and its components, OPC UA server included, with informa-
tion on the actual memory consumption.
Figure 9: Implementation architecture of OPC UA on the TPS1 evaluation platform [32]
The authors of [32] concluded that OPC UA can be scaled down to IoT devices with very limited capabilities while
retaining its main features. The authors successfully ran the OPC UA server written in “ANSI C” with a limited set of
services (to browse the address space and read the application data) on the TPS1 system with a total RAM consumption
of only 10KB [32]. The authors also state that this is probably one of the applications of OPC UA on one of the smallest
servers [32]. Finally, the authors concluded that sensor devices can be used to communicate data through the Internet
even with very limited capabilities thanks to OPC UA [32].
18
2.1.5 Summary of the BSI security analysis on OPC UA
The security analysis at issue has been organized and run by the German government to evaluate the security of the OPC
UA standard (version 1.02) and of the official reference implementation of the stack written in “ANSI C” by the OPC
foundation (version 1.02.344.5) [49] [24] [33].
Regarding the findings related to the OPC UA specifications, the BSI did not found critical flaws in it in fact, citing [49]:
“The specification analysis performed has shown that OPC UA offers a high level of security if security Mode Sign and,
above all, securityMode SignAndEncrypt is used. No systematic errors could be detected.”. Furthermore, the authors of
[49] discusses the fact that DoS attacks are natually very hard to be prevented in general and they can only be faced with
an appropriate IT infrastructure [49]. From the analysis at issue, disparate vectors for DoS attacks has been identified.
Two of those are discussed and detected by security policy scripts presented in sections 3.2.5 and 3.2.7.
The BSI added more suggestions for the OPC UA specifications that the author summarized here [49]:
• Add specific minimum requirements for random number generation
• Add notes about outdated and unsecure algorithms like SHA-1
• The specifications states to use the same key for signature and encryption (different keys should be used)
• Add support for elliptic curves (that would enforce security especially on devices with smaller processing power)
• Default values for standard parameters should be provided (differentiated for different classes of devices)
• No protection against repetitive failed authentication attempts (the server could double the wait time after each
failed attempt)
• When security mode: “Sign” and “Sign and encrypt” is combined with “securityPolicyUri=None” no security layer
is applied. Suggested improvement: prohibit this setting
• Arrays can be nested but no maximum limit is specified to the recursion. Specify this limit.
• Specify what should happen if a gap in the sequence numbers is identified by an OPC UA application
• Lack of forward secrecy: if an attacker discover the client and server nonces exchanged during the “SecureChannel”
establishment then he can decrypt the subsequent messages. Good key exchange practices should be specified
Moreover, the BSI added statements to suggest to the OPC foundation to improve the accuracy of the specification by
adding more details and in some cases they suggested to use more specific words [49].
Regarding the official reference implementation of the OPC UA stack, provided by the OPC foundation [24], the BSI
reported several findings.
The static analysis of the code did not revealed any security issue. The fuzzing, developed with the Peach framework
led to two findings: the validity of the security numbers is not validated by the stack and this lead to replay attacks (the
author implemented a detection script in section 3.2.4). The other finding is cited here: “Several deviations between the
specification and implementation of the OPC Foundation stack as well as inconsistencies in the specification” [49]. No
other discovery has been made through fuzzing in the analysis.
The dynamic code analysis revealed memory leaks that could be exploited to compromise the availability of systems
running on the stack. Further implications of these issues has not been analyzed and the BSI states that another specific
analysis of each of the issues would be necessary [49]. The tests performed showed a code coverage of approximately
43% of the statements and of 23% of the branches. This because only the single-threaded server was tested during the
analysis and moreover some OPC UA services such as the subscription service were not tested during the analysis [49].
The BSI analysis excluded some components from the scope that otherwise would have been too broad and would have
required much more time. Such components are: the multicast DNS (mDNS) system, utilized in the discovery service set
of OPC UA. The functionality related to the CRLs were also excluded from the testing.
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2.2 Bro
Bro is a modern full-fledged network intrusion detection system. It is designed so that an “event engine” generates an
input for a “policy script interpreter” [61]. The separation of these two components gives Bro extreme flexibility into
achieving the two different purposes of parsing the raw protocols and making intrusion detection on the actual structured
data. Abstracting the mechanism from the policy is fundamental for having simple definitions of both.
With the growth of the Internet and the increasing number of devices interconnected, also the amount of illicit attacks
tends to increase. The activity of detecting such outbreaks is called Network Intrusion Detection[61] and that should be
Bro’s goal. Unfortunately once placed a “monitor” into a network, it becomes possible to actually spy on people, other
than doing network intrusion detection. Bro presents an ethical dilemma that users face when they run it. Furthermore,
network monitors can be subject of attacks that aim at subverting them [61].
Bro is designed with high-speed traffic in mind. The core architecture and the binpac[64] extensions are written in C++
and compiled efficiently by the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) for the target machine. The system reads packets directly
from the network interfaces and if the analysis of such packets is too slow for the going traffic, it does queue them for later
consumption [61]. Indeed, Bro has the ability to produce real-time custom notification programmed in policy scripts.
They fundamentally determine how Bro will process the flowing packets. Developers can write new security policies in
the Bro script programming language to define the rules of detection. Writing policies in C were not considered when
designing Bro, for clear security reasons [61]. Bro scripts are written in a high-level-like language but run efficiently
thanks to Bro interpreter, written in C++ [8]. Efforts are in progress to build a Bro scripts’ compiler [6].
At the moment Bro supports more than 50 protocols and several detection scripts per each one [4]. There is also a plug-in
system where it is possible to add functionality to Bro NIDS, other than increasing its parsing capabilities [9]. Figure 10
shows the flow of the data from the network to the core of Bro.
Figure 10: Bro mechanism-policy separation [61]
An assumption that has to be done when having a Bro instance monitoring the network is that the attackers know the
source code of it and will use this knowledge in the attempts to overwhelm or subvert the system [61]. Mainly, three
type of attacks are determined in [61]:
• Crash attacks attempt to terminate or deviate Bro code execution to respectively, Denial of Service (DoS) the NIDS,
or to run arbitrary code on the target system [61].
• Overload attacks aim at consuming all the resources of the system running Bro to DoS it. A clever attacker might
exploit code paths that trigger high resource usage sending small muted packets or he might even exploit memory
leak flaws [61].
• Subterfuge attacks try to evade the monitoring of malicious traffic by tricking the NIDS into ignoring the attack
payload. This also is generally easier when the source code of the NIDS is public [61].
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For these reasons Bro have been carefully implemented to avoid this problems, but, some mistakes might still be nested
in the code base.
Bro is an advanced NIDS in which it is possible to develop new modules both as components of the event engine (parsers)
or as elements of the policy scripts interpreter (analyzers). The parsers are compiled into native executables and each
parser plug-in is in a different static library that will be loaded by the main Bro executable. On the other hand, Bro
security policy scripts are specified at runtime from the command line and they do not need to be pre-compiled into static
or dynamic libraries.
Figure 11: Bro modular architecture
It is possible to note from figure 6 that the event engine, further discussed in section 2.2.1 and the policy scripts in-
terpreter, examined in section 2.2.2, are components that are embedded into the Bro executable at compile time. To
generate static libraries for plug-ins is a functional solution as it separates the actual binaries from the main Bro exe-
cutable and avoid the overhead of dynamic libraries, that are really useful when the library at issue has to be shared by
several processes (not this case). Instead, policy scripts are the only software component that can be plugged at runtime
but they give extreme flexibility at the behavior of Bro because they define how Bro is going to analyze the parsed traffic.
The developed plug-in gives an API interface that Bro policy scripts can use to process OPC UA traffic. The API includes
new custom data structures created on purpose. Fundamentally, the plug-in defines the limits of the potentially imple-
mentable policy scripts. If there are limitations on the access to the traffic data then the Bro policy script can not do
anything but the Binpac plug-in has to be improved.
Figure 12 depicts the output while compiling the Bro OPC UA plug-in to a static library:
Figure 12: Bro plug-in compilation log
2.2.1 Event engine
As already presented, the event engine is that component of Bro that takes raw input from libpcap. It first performs
checks to verify that the IP header’s checksum is correct. If the Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) mismatch, the event
engine generates an event to notify the exception and discards the packet [61]. Otherwise, Bro assembles back IP
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datagrams from valid IP fragments [61]. If all the IP fragments are valid, the event engine looks up for the connection
state of the relative TCP or UDP port numbers, creating a new state if none is existing [61].
Bro builds “tcpdump” traces from the traffic it monitors; but is the connection handler that specifies if a packet has to
be recorded completely, only the headers, or not registered at all. For TCP packets, Bro’s event engine tests whether
the headers’ checksum is genuine, then it might update the connection status if TCP packets with flags are received
(SYN, ACK, RST, etc). The successive step is to generate events to feed the policy script interpreter [61]. For example
when a SYN packet is received but at that point in time no connection is registered with those hosts and ports, then
a “connection_attempt” event is generated. On the other way, if after a SYN it comes an ACK, then the event engine
generates a “conenction_established” event. It is also possible that the remote party replies with a RST packet and at that
point “connection_rejected” is the occurring event [61]. Similarly, when UDP packets are processed, “udp_request” and
“udp_reply” events are generated. Developers can write custom protocol parsers in Binpac (section 2.3), to generate new
events, expanding Bro’s capabilities.
2.2.2 Policy script interpreter
When the event engine has finished to process a packet, it checks if events has been generated (they are kept in a First
In First Out (FIFO) queue). If there is any, then the policy script interpreter will process such events in the order they
arrived [61]. Bro’s policy scripts are written using the Bro programming language with which it is possible to define
event handlers that are essentially Bro functions, but with no return value [61]. Also, Bro supports asynchronous events
as a link between the event engine and the policy script interpreter giving space for powerful extensibility [61]. In the
next section, 2.2.3, there is a brief description of features, concepts and structures of the Bro language.
The goal of the policy script interpreter is the ultimate goal of the NIDS Bro. That is to detect intrusions in real-time
or from recorded network traffic. Further goals are: to log communications, to supervise the state of the network or of
the servers and all the other possible activities which require monitoring. This is the core part of Bro, the actual NIDS’s
policies programming. But it is only possible to program security policies in Bro when a working parser for the protocol
at issue is available. In this thesis, the author develops a parser for the OPC UA standard and discuss its design and
implementation respectively in section 3.1.1 and 3.2.1.
A yet undiscussed but useful functionality of Bro, is the one that allows Bro policy scripts to dynamically change the
content of the flowing packets [34]. This functionality can be used to alter the content of packets and to block hosts,
therefore can be used to prevent attacks. These security measures are implemented only when there is an underlying
reliable and well programmed intrusion detection system because in the case in which the NIDS mistakenly drops a
non malicious packet, the integrity of its connection is harmed. If that happens on OPC UA communications between
industrial machineries, then the process of automation is in danger.
2.2.3 Bro language
The Bro language is the programming tool that has been developed to implement analysis of network traffic through
high-level events generated by the engine discussed in section 2.2.1. The Bro language is used to implement detection
and logging scripts. Potentially, any computation can be performed on a Bro policy script. They can also run system
commands and arbitrarily create files on the file system.
As previously stated, Bro’s designers wanted to avoid “usual mistakes” from arbitrary developers by using a strongly
typed language. First-class values in Bro are IP addresses, port numbers, host names and other components that are
normally part of packet’s headers [61]. Bro’s language atomic types are: bool for boolean, int for integers, count for non
negative integers, double for double precision floating point and string for byte sequences [61]. All of these types but
string are called arithmetic types and mixing them in expressions automatically cast bool into count, count into int and
int into double [61] . Other types are: time, interval, port, addr, for IP addresses and many more. Bro also supports
different aggregated types: a record is an element that contains a collection of items of arbitrary types [61]. Table is
another aggregated type: it allows to link keys to values in an associative array style [61]. Finally, Set is the type of a
data structure that can contain an arbitrary number of elements, similarly to normal lists.
Bro provide several C-like operators to manipulate atomic types. To access the attribute of a record field the “$” symbol
must be used. Assignments of aggregate values only make the assigned variable to point to the assignee [61], so that
efficiency is not wasted on huge objects’ copies. Bro’s developers reserved to the future the possibility of introducing
a copy construct, to make “deep” copies [61]. The “in” operator can be instead used to check a string against regular
expressions or if a key is contained in a table or in a set [61].
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Finally, Bro provides a set of functions to perform operations like: “fmt” to format a string in “sprintf” style, “mask_addr”
applies a network mask to a certain network address, “open” and “close” are used to manipulate files, while “getenv” gives
access to the environment variables and “system” executed a string in a Unix shell command and others [61].
Variables in Bro have two possible scopes: local, to a function or event handler, or global [61]. Local variables are
declared using the keyword “local” [61] inside functions or event handlers. Global variables are preceded by the “global”
keyword and must be declare out of any defined function body [61]. “const” is used to define constants.
Advanced functionalities like implementing tables that use developer’s defined data structures is unfortunately not sup-
ported yet but the Bro project is still in development and therefore, new versions of Bro will probably overcome gaps like
this one.
In conclusion, the described language is Turing complete and therefore the right tool to achieve stateful intrusion detec-
tion analysis [7]. Bro language provides handy types and functions to policy script writers [61]. Strong type checking
and exception handling prevent typical programming errors [61]. These and all the other described features are what
make Bro the ideal candidate as a NIDS.
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2.3 Binpac
2.3.1 Overview
A key problem in network analysis is the parsing of packets [64]. Protocols have always been the mean of communication
between different machines. Protocols have been evolving with computer networks and software. New applications
rarely implements the network protocol for scratch but reuses the already existing ones. Some other times for efficiency
reasons, or to add functionalities, developers rewrite simple protocols from scratch to make them fit the purpose of
their own applications. The specifications of these protocols might be public through Request For Comments (RFC),
other kind of documentation, or they might be private, when the protocol is developed by a company that does not
release the details of its structure to the public it is then called, proprietary protocol. Without the original specifications,
understanding syntax and semantics of a protocol is really hard because it requires reverse engineering, that process of
understanding how something works without having the inner structure and details of it but a black box where to put
input and get output.
Binpac has been developed to solve the problem of parsing network application protocols generically, so that an efficient
and robust parser can be produced from Binpac and embedded in any software [64]. The process of parsing involves
transforming a shapeless bit stream into a typed, structured, high-level representation of the traffic that can then be
used for semantic analysis of the network interactions [64]. Binpac has been developed as a declarative language. The
authors of [64], show how parsers for common network application protocols can be built and show their robustness and
efficiency through testing. Then, they use this new parsers to substitute several handcrafted parsers implemented in Bro,
to show that Binpac can effectively be easily combined with other software to enhance its functionality and abstract the
network traffic parsing problem [64].
In short, Binpac is a compiler for his declarative language. It is similar to Yet Another Compiler Compiler (YACC) because
of its declarative nature. They both generate parsers and they both run on well defined, formal structures (although of
different kinds). Binpac source files are at their basic form just declarations of the packet structures, with the possibility
of adding “C/C++” code in line to enhance functionalities [64]. The authors of [64] observe that it is generically hard
to write efficient and robust application-level parsers without implementing several mistakes and repeating a lot of code
because ot the nature of parsing itself. It requires robust and fast software to have reliable parsing and that is not trivial
of the complexity of modern protocols. Furthermore, application layer parsers are important components of a lot of
software that is used for the most disparate purposes. Monitoring tools such as tcpdump and Wireshark make use of
application level parsers and real-time network intrusion detection systems such as Bro and Snort do exactly the same
[64].
Binpac is therefore an improvement from the point of view of the developer that has to implement the support for
a new protocol for some software but is also an improvement in terms of robustness of the parser itself and hence
an advancement in the security of the parsing routines themselves. It is quite tragic, to think that security enhancing
tools such as monitors and NIDS might have flaws that allow an attacker to take over the monitoring system [42].
But it is normal, computers are inherently complex machines and it is hard to foresee their behavior in any condition.
Furthermore, while for software bugs there is a logical explanation (sometimes, unfortunally twisted up), the hardware
bugs involve more physical phenomena other than pure logical issues. When the explanation requires notions of quantum
physics, not many people may have clear ideas about the issue. Another curious phenomenon is computer malfunctioning
provoked by cosmic rays [22] and the row hammer bug [55]. For all of these reasons, computers must be carefully
programmed and configured, with a continuous cyclic work of improving, studying and testing that better suit the
development process of such complex, sometimes, apparently unpredictable machines.
The authors of Binpac analyzed the modern structure of application level protocols to gather the knowledge needed to
develop a tool to parse them all. One of the main differences that the authors identified in computer protocols is that they
are categorized into two classes: binary and ASCII protocols [64]. For example, messages of the first class, such as the
Domain Name System (DNS) requests and replies consist in a number of data fields. These fields, express their semantic
values by standard types such as integers and strings [64]. On the other hand, human readable ASCII protocols, such as
the Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) have that their requests/replies
are separated by carriage-return/line-feed special characters. Another observed characteristic of modern application
layer protocols is that they use variable length arrays to convey non fixed magnitude of information [64]. Strings are
simply array of characters. Binary protocols instead use specific encoding scheme to represent the data contained. They
might use the classical little endian or big endian encoding, as well as other, more sophisticated techniques.
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One of the biggest problem of real-time protocol parsers is that they need to handle concurrent input [64]. In a real
network scenario it is normal that multiple parallel connections are established and exchange data concurrently. Parsers
generated by yacc/lex process input in a serial fashion. When the syntactic/lexical definition is terminated, the parser
generator run to generate “C” code that will parse the defined grammar/syntax. Because there is only one input per
time, in the compiler, only one thread is needed. More threads can be used to exploit the capabilities of multiprocessor
platforms. But, a network parser requires more threads, to handle concurrent packet flows, or a single thread that process
input incrementally as it arrives and switches between different flows to handle all of them.
As already outlined, robustness of network protocol parsers determine the security of the systems on which they run on.
An attacker may craft special packets to lead the protocol parser to an error. Errors may be provoked by irregularities
in the network traffic or corner cases that were not included in the specifications of the protocol and their consequences
might vary from infinite loops stalls to program crashes that might eventually be controlled by a keen attacker to achieve
arbitrary code execution. Moreover, contrary to compilers, network protocol parsers can not just complain and terminate
if the input is malformed or incomplete; they have to handle it robustly and consistently generate message logs to notice
the unusual event to the user, programmer or administrator that handle the software that involve the parsing.
2.3.2 Language
Binpac defines a declarative language that must be used to determine the rules that will drive the generation of the
application protocol parser that will be the output of the compilation process. The generated parser will be in “C++” to
be efficient, flexible and object oriented [64].
A Binpac type describes both: the layout and ordering of the bits and the structure that will be built from them after
parsing [64]. Elementary types in Binpac are: “int8”, “int16”, “int32”, for signed integers, while: “uint8”, “uint16”,
“uint32” represent unsigned fixed length integers [64]. A string can be described by a constant string, a regular expression,
or a more generic bytestring that can be of a variable length, “&length” or long till the end of the data [64].
External types can be defined by writing “C++” code. Those types will be valid when used in computations (e.g as
parameters types) but they can not be used as types of any data fields in messages of the defined protocol. User can
define composite types: using “record” to describe a collection of heterogeneous variables, “case” that is a conditional
statement to evaluate the type of a field and “array” that is a sequence of elements of the same type [64]. For each
user defined type, Binpac generates a class with fields as class members and a parse function to extract the fields from a
sequence of bytes based on the described layout [64].
Byte order is another property of the type and packets structures defined by the developer. Using the attribute “&byte-
order” permits to specify one of them. Another important feature of the language are derivative fields. They are used to
keep intermediate computation results, or to further process the outcome of parsing. Derivative fields are defined within
“&let{ ... }” attributes [64].
State management is a fundamental feature offered by the Binpac language. It defines the notions of flow and connection.
A flow is just a sequence of messages, while a connection is a pair of flows. “Connection” means any type of network
flow between two hosts [64]. Moreover, each flow might be of two different input types: “datagram” if the messages are
received in one packet or a “byte stream” in which the data delivered boundaries do not match the message confines. The
two input types can be specified using “datagram” and “flowunit” keywords respectively.
Although the mechanism of types’ parametrization allows to keep temporary information within a message, it might be
possible that in a certain scenario, the developer needs to store information at connection or flow level. To declare a
parser that will be capable of having a per connection/flow state, the following syntax must be used when declaring the
analyzer: “analyzer <name> withcontext”, at the beginning of the root Binpac source file [64].
In yacc, the developer can inject “C/C++” code next to the grammatical productions to process for example the con-
struction of abstract syntax trees that represent the parsed program. In Binpac there is a different approach; the source
code is translated into “C++” by the compiler and then the parsed data are further passed to the Bro policy scripts by
generating events. However, types can be enriched so that, it is possible to link a call to an external function that is fired
when an instance of that type is successfully parsed. Therefore making it possible to connect “C++” code to events of
successful (or not) parsing. Note that this kind of connection is the only link between Binpac and Bro [64]. This thesis
deepens the argument subsequently, especially in the implementation section 3.2.1. In the same is also discussed the
exception handling for malformed packet detection.
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Binpac implements simple syntactic constructs that permit to easily separate parsing from analysis code; it is similar to a
high-level, low-level tasks separation. In Binpac it is possible to specify packets’ headers definitions separately from the
event generation to pass to Bro. Instead, semantically, the two separated pieces of code will combine together by first
parsing the packet and then generating events in sequence. Therefore, Binpac implements some “separation of concerns”,
hence making its code cleaner by separating parsing and analysis sources [64].
As previously stated, the Binpac compiler supports incremental input. This mean that it can keep track of the state at
which the parsing is arrived to. ASCII protocols are usually line based or alternate between explicit denoted length and
line based. Thus, Binpac provides two special attributes: &length, used to state the length of a field. The other is &oneline
that basically instructs the parser to keep reading the input till the End Of the Line (EOL) [64].
Binpac detects and catch various kind of failures by throwing run-time exceptions. It is possible then to handle the errors,
to recover, or at least, report the exceptions. As already discussed, failures might arise from incomplete or incorrect
specifications in the Binpac code, missing parsing cases; malformed packets that contain wrong length field values, that
are a possible scenario in case of actual cyber attacks [17][16]. Another source of errors are interrupted inputs that leave
the parser in an inconsistent state [64].
Boundary checking is that process of verifying whether the input byte stream fits within the input buffer, as well as
controlling that the tasks performed on it do not imply read or write operations out of the programmed buffers. Errors
on boundary checking lead to buffer overflows vulnerabilities that afflict computer systems since their existence. This
process can be made efficient by logically grouping the checks together as much as possible and put them in the code
routine every time that check is needed. Binpac does implement this kind of simplification [64]. The code of parsers is
very arithmetical, repetitive and mechanical in general, that is why a simplification as Binpac comes very useful.
As previously introduced, handling chunked packets is something a parser has to deal with. Binpac specifies a “&chunked”
property that can be bound to byte sequences. In this way, the parser will pass to the “&processchunk” function that can
simply skip over the gap if there is one. In this way Binpac handles most of the common content gaps. Instead, in hand-
written parsers in Bro, packet gaps are handled in a similar way but on an individual case basis. The solution provided
by Binpac handles this class of problems universally for all protocols [64].
Binpac also enforces type safety. This task is accomplished by generating parsing code that ensures that only the case
selected during the parsing can be accessed. If this is not possible, it throws a run-time exception. Also, access to elements
of arrays is always enforced by boundary checking [64]. Last but not least, Binpac allows embedding of “C++” code and
hence it can not guarantee complete safety during the run-time because errors might be introduced arbitrarily.
Another notable feature is the opportunity to have user-defined error detection functions that are automatically bound
by the parser compiler. This functionality is achieved by the use of the “&check” attribute in the specific field that the user
wants to check [64].
Errors handling is currently implemented in Binpac as follows: when a failure in encountered, it logs the error, discard
the unfinished message and then proceeds to the next chunk of data. A potential limitation of this approach is that, for
stream based protocols, the successive packet might not be aligned with the next payload chunk [64]. In the future, the
authors of Binpac plan to implement a mechanism to rediscover message boundaries in such corner cases [64].
2.3.3 Evaluation
Binpac is currently used in Bro to parse 25 of the 52 supported protocols [4]. Between these there are: ssh, sip, krb,
imap, mysql, modbus, etc. Furthermore, the authors of Binpac have compared the complexity and performances of the
two different approaches: hand-written Bro’s protocol parsers and those auto-generated from the specifications by Binpac
for the HTTP and the DNS protocols [64]. The following table report the comparison.
Figure 13: Binpac versus hand-written protocol parsers [64]
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From the previous table it is possible to observe that Binpac parsers are much more efficient in parsing the HTTP compared
to the hand-written ones. Instead, the DNS protocol is parsed faster by the hand-written parser. The previous observation
suggests that Binpac’s generated parsers are more efficient in handling ASCII based instead of binary based protocols.
However, the number of lines of code decreases drastically in binpac. The said change shrinks the overall complexity of
the parser, simplifying testing and code reviews that will eventually be performed on that software. Therefore, Binpac
provides a comprehensive new approach to the problem of parsing that improves security and usability of the state of the
art of application protocol parsers.
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3 Contributions
This section contains the report of the contributions of the project. Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 treat the design of respectively,
a binpac plug-in and Bro’s security policy scripts. Instead, sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.3 discuss the implementation of the
binpac plug-in and Bro policy scripts. Sections 3.2.4, 3.2.5, 3.2.6 and 3.2.7 describe the implementations of policy scripts
for attacks identified in [49]. Furthermore, in section 3.3, the plug-in is tested for performances and robustness.
3.1 Design
3.1.1 OPC UA binpac
Bro allows developers to write plug-ins to expand the available functionalities and to support new protocols (section 2.2).
The author used this feature to implement the parsing of OPC UA in the NIDS Bro. Every plug-in in Bro has basically two
main directories. In one are defined all the Binpac source files. In the other the developer can write default policy scripts
that will be loaded with the plug-in itself to support features such as writing what happens to log files. The default policy
scripts embedded and deployed with the plug-in are not limited in terms of complexity, therefore the user can load all
the scripts he likes till resource exhaustion.
The Binpac source folder is located under “$BRO_PATH/src/analyzer/protocols/$PROTOCOL_NAME” while the Bro policy
script default directory is under “$BRO_PATH/scripts/base/protocols/$PROTOCOL_NAME”. Those, are the main locations
of the source files written in Binpac and Bro (*.pac and *.bro).
Another important file is “$BRO_PATH/scripts/base/init-bare.bro” because it runs at every instantiation of the Bro’s policy
script runtime environment. The aforesaid file will be used to load the custom types for the OPC UA framework.
To implement the parser the author wrote Binpac code to specify the logic structure of the possible OPC UA packets. In
Binpac, every packet is parsed by starting from a non-terminal symbol, “OPCUA_PDU”. Then, based on the “message_type”,
Binpac will choose which structure it has to parse. Non OPC UA packets will not result in successful parsing because the
grammatical definition will not match on them. Once the packets format is defined, it becomes possible to generate Bro
events that will be passed to policy scripts for further processing (section 2.2.1). This abstraction allows to completely
separate the problem of parsing from the application of security policies on the traffic. Binpac code handles parsing,
while Bro code implements the analysis. Furthermore, meaningful data structures like vectors, sets and records can be
passed to Bro scripts with events.
This system is efficient because the Binpac parser is converted to “C++” from its compiler and then to machine code
from GCC. Even if the policy script engine runs as an interpreter it is efficient because of the language simplicity and
its specificity. Moreover, the created Binpac plug-in will notify events in real-time to the Bro’s policy engine that will
consume them before they fulfill all the available memory. As discussed in section 2.2, Bro is a network intrusion
detection system that consumes traffic in real-time by keeping the received information in a FIFO queue so that it will be
processed in chronological order by the policy script interpreter. If Bro can not keep the pace with the network traffic, it
will eventually fill all the available Random Access Memory (RAM) and the system would start trashing between RAM
and swap storage space, tragically slowing down performances and responsiveness of the whole system. Therefore, it is
important, in production scenarios, to test that a certain system, with a specific configuration, programmed with some
policy scripts, can keep the pace of a certain network without exhausting the resources. Otherwise, running Bro on a
cluster architecture might bring the missing computational power to analyze all the traffic [5].
Binpac is a declarative based language discussed in section 2.3. It has compact and accurate structure definitions for fine-
grained packet description. It allows also to bind callback functions and variables to attach metadata with the parsed
structures. In the implementation there will be a heavy use of Binpac to define the different packet structure of OPC UA
packets.
Finally, regarding the organization of the sources: the files are organized hierarchically having that the sources that
contain the principal data structures include the needed substructures form other minor files. This is a modular orga-
nization of the sources that aims at keeping the content of each file of a limited length, possibly printable in just one
screen rendering and divide the content based on relevancy. To clarify, i.e. “opcua-message.pac” does define the binary
substructure of a “MSG” typed message. But it also include several other files to allow definitions of other files to be used
locally. Fundamentally, the include mechanism works as the basic “C++” include pre-processsor directive.
The Binpac plug-in is probably the most substantial contribution of this project because it opens the Bro network intrusion
detection system to the analysis of OPC UA traffic. Once implemented and tested, the plug-in can be used to write policy
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scripts to detect violations of the standard, malformed packets and different types of attacks. Furthermore, policy scripts
can also be used to implement arbitrary analysis on the structured information flow, with the help of files, databases and
all the informational constructs that might be necessary.
As design issues the author did not needed to model complex schemes but to organize the parser structure in small, easy
to read files with meaningful names. Plug-ins written in Binpac are very compact because of the synthetic nature of the
Binpac declarative language. A plug-in structure is normally of this form:
• Binpac parser definitions
• Binpac events and types definitions
• build and pass events to Bro scripts
The previous list can also be rewritten as follows:
• packets’ structure “.pac”
• events and types “.bif”
• data conversion and events generation “.pac” (containing mainly “C++” code)
These are the main issues that a developer has to face when implementing a Binpac plug-in to parse an unsupported
protocol.
Figure 14 depicts an overall picture of the pluggable components of Bro. It is possible to observe that there are plug-
ins, written in Binpac, which purpose it to extend Bro’s parsing capabilities to unsupported protocols. There are also
default Bro policy scripts, as previously discussesd in this section these are policy scripts that are loaded by default in
Bro. Furthermore, the system includes a file that contains the definitions of the functions and data structure utilized in
Bro’s policy scripts. Finally, it is also possible to provide additional security policy scripts through the command line.
Figure 14: Bro components
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A big advantage of Binpac is that the developer does not have to care about the low-level classic issues of implementing a
parser. The programmer can focus on giving meaningful protocol descriptions and write code to build and fill structures
that will be passed to the Bro policy scripts for further processing.
Once the parser is working, the efforts can move to the development of effective policy scripts that can detect something
interesting like attacks, malformed packets and violations of the standard.
In section 3.2.8, this thesis describes that the parser also provides the printing of the exceptions, that is useful to detect
malformed packets. The aforesaid transient data might trigger a memory corruption flaw or a similar one in some OPC
UA reference implementation. It is useful that the parser notices of corrupted packets, therefore it is possible to use the
system to detect attempts of attack, as well as deviations from the specifications. Another possible application is to use a
random bit flipping program or a similar mutative algorithm on OPC UA sample packets and then pass them to the parser
to detect malformed packets and build specific test cases to use against some reference implementation.
Some source files, are of the extension “.bif”, that stands for Builtin Functions (BiF). BiFs sources provide a convenient
way of interacting between the “C++” event engine and the script policy processor by making “C++” functions available
to policy scripts and by making Bro variables, types and constants available to the “C++” [11]. Examples of builtin
functions’ files in the plug-in are “events.bif” and “types.bif”. They declare the API (events) and the types, respectively.
Bro variables and constants are represented in the “C++” layer as pointers to instances of the “Val” class. Furthermore,
there is a hierarchy of classes in Bro that builds the basic type environment for the security policy script interpreter [11].
Bro types are instead represented in the native “C++” code with the usage of the “BroType” class. Again, classes are
organize on hierarchies, in fact, a Bro “record” is identified by the class “RecordType”, that inherits methods and attributes
from the class “BroType”.
Similarly, Bro events are represented as instances of the “EventHandlerPtr” class. Furthermore, BiF files support names-
paces and modules usage. Using the same syntax as in Bro’s policy scripts, “module <MODULENAME>”, it is possible to
specify the declaration of variables, types, enumerations, constants, functions and events belong to a specific module. If
using “GLOBAL” as a module name, then the scope will be the default one.
To write the BiF sources is fundamental to have the plug-in running. Substantially, BiF scripts are the connection layer
that links the “C++” parser to the “C++” policy script interpreter. They must at least declare the events that will be
generated. When Binpac compiles BiF sources, it generates the required “C++” classes, and therefore the reference of
it from other parts of the Binpac source, for example when the event has to be fired, there is a call to the event function
that has not been declared directly by the developer but generated by the Binpac compiler before compiling the rest of
the source.
In this part of development, during the parser creation, the author used the GNU is Not Unix (GNU) Debugger (GDB)
to debug Bro and to understand the mistakes committed in order to fix them [13]. GDB was used with the graphical
front-end called “DDD” [14]. That is a graphic user interface for command-line based debuggers like GDB. It supports
memory inspection features, monitoring variables, breakpoints, various stepping modes and other features similar to
modern symbol based debuggers.
3.1.2 OPC UA policy scripts
Bro is a high-level scripting language designed to write policy scripts (section 2.2.2) for the Bro NIDS. As previously
stated, it was implemented to give a fast, easy to use and secure programming tool for the network intrusion detection
system’s policy definitions. It is Turing complete and very similar to “C++”, in fact it can basically embed “C++” code.
It supports user defined data structures, as well as several default types. Bro language is the tool that the author used to
implement security policies.
Having a working parser for the OPC UA traffic makes it possible to apply policy scripts in the Bro language. The author
programmed the parser in Binpac to solve the parsing problem, as discussed in section 3.2.1. This section is dedicated to
define how policy scripts should behave in terms of general guidelines.
Security policies can be very broad in general. A potential analysis may inquiry the integrity of the packet by checking for
invalid values, checksums, etc. Also, the variety of security policies should cover the interactions the analysis wants to
cover. The standard is very wide and complex, a thoroughful analysis of all the interactions would require huge efforts.
Furthermore, the encypted traffic can not be revealed because of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) presence [45], unless
some “SSL strip” mechanism is in place. However, it is still possible to analyze SSL handshakes and all the unencrypted
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traffic without breaking the encryption. Basically, real-time data processing of the OPC UA packets is possible within the
limit of sniffing traffic on a network, or providing packet capture files.
The tool used in this thesis to implement security policies is the Turing complete Bro language. Its structure, as previously
explained is similar to the usual “C++” with no preprocessor macros. The code can be written in functions, the developer
can define custom structures and variables made of complex and simple types, for example: counter, set, table, string, etc.
The main interface between the policy script and the event engine are, as the name suggest, events. As described in
section 3.1.1, events are defined in BiF files, as well as types. Events are the APIs that bring structured data to the policy
script runtime environment. Bro developers that wish to write an analysis for some protocol have to first take a look at the
available API. Then, they can organize their operations based on them. The advantage of this system is that in this way
Bro code just focus on the analysis of the structured data instead of having to care for the parsing, that is accomplished
by the plug-in Binpac code.
Bro policy scripts use an event based programming paradigm that comes very handy as well as all the other domain
specific features they implemented to make it a successful tool to write security policies scripts.
There is not that much which need to be designed when writing Bro policies scripts. During the development, the harder
part is probably the writing of the plug-in that provides a framework to Bro’s policies scripts because it is lower level
programming and it is harder to debug. Once the development moves to policy scripts, then the programming comes
easier, because the Bro language is of a higher level compared to Binpac and “C++”. It has constructs that simpify tasks
that otherwise would require more complex definitions. It does not need the developer to allocate/deallocate memory
or to take care of bounds checking. It provides specific keywords to handle particular tasks like resetting the value of a
variable after a certain amount of time it was not read and/or written. The Bro language is the fast and secure solution
that the Bro project proposed to make NIDS specific processing. The next sections describe how this language can actually
be used to implement functional detection mechanisms.
3.2 Implementation
The author implemented the solution using principally three programming languages. Bro, a “C++” like language,
to write stateful security policies processing; Binpac, a declarative based programming language created with the only
purpose of compiling network application protocol parsers by writing formal specifications of the packets. Also, “C++”
code has been written by the author to complement Binpac functionalities and to manage data conversion between
Binpac and Bro.
The code has been written following a simple programming style. Names of user defined functions usually describe what
they actually do. Conversion routines instead take the name of the type that is going to be converted to the Bro policy
script Runtime Environment (RE). Names of types in Binpac are all uppercase letters. Name of Bro’s types all lowercase
characters. Using this basic distinctions the author was allowed to give the same names to Binpac’s types and those of
Bro. Precautions like those just described improve the source code readability. Names of fields in binary structures have
been taken from the official documentation (IEC 62541) and from the Wireshark OPC UA dissector [41] to respect as
much as possible existing conventions and to not foster confusion.
With the final solution is possible to feed Bro with policy scripts that other developers may write and exploit the new
parsing capability implemented with the OPC UA plug-in. The author fundamentally provided an extension to the Bro
parser and event engine to provide a new set of events, that will function as Application Program Interface (API) for
policy scripts at runtime. Refer to appendix D for detailed informations.
The contributions are not limited to that because with the solution, a basic set of policy modules have been provided.
To achieve tasks such as: logging OPC UA network packets information content and enforce security policies. Potentially
arbitrary policies can be defined thanks to the stateful interpreter processor. Moreover, detection of malformed packets
is implemented in the OPC UA parser, section 3.2.8.
Fundamental part of the contributions is also the script that the author provides to compile and embed in Bro the plug-
in. The author did not used any Integrated Development Environment (IDE) to develop the project and hence all the
compilation, linking and testing processes were done through a standard “shell bash” and other FOSS software.
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3.2.1 Binpac
The core of the plug-in is the Binpac parser. Its root file is “opcua.pac”. It defines basic and mandatory Binpac’s structures
to define elementary objects such as the data flow and include the rest of the sources. In the source code it is possible to
observe that there is a statement that defines a “flowunit” named variable. That is needed to make sure that Binpac uses
incremental input and allows us to use special keyword such as “&length” and “&oneline” in the source code. If instead
it would be defined, “datagram”, Binpac would not enable this features. In the source code is also stated that without
incremental input the parser would be more efficient but the author needs to define variable length strings and hence,
“&length”, is needed.
In the main source file, “opcua.pac” are included also “types.bif.h” and “events.bif.h”. Those are “C++” source files,
generate by Binpac using “types.bif” and “events.bif” respectively. They define the added Bro structures (types) and API
(events).
A very important source file is “opcua-protocol.pac”. It defines the “OPCUA_PDU” type, that is used to initiate the definition
for all the packets. It is defined as a “record” and it contains the representing structure of information written using
terminal and non-terminal symbols. As previously described, in section 2.3, there are several default types: “uint8” to
“uint64”, and “bytestring” for variable length strings.
A fundamental construct is the case statement. Its syntax is the following: between round brackets, right after the case
keyword is placed the field or expression using the available fields, parameters and/or metadata. The evaluated expres-
sion will be compared sequentially to the different cases and the matching one will pass. Furthermore, the “default” value
can be used to match any value, it is practically a wildcard. This type of constructs might remember of functional pro-
gramming, when the functions are all defined on a simple case basis. Also, the dynamic typing just described allows also
to pass fields from the current structure to the dynamically defined type as Binpac supports this mecchanism. Therefore,
information can flow from the Protocol Data Unit (PDU) to the contained message. Following, an example of the case
construct from the plug-in’s Binpac source:
type QUALIFIED_NAME() = record {
id : uint16 ;
len : uint32 &byteorder=l i t t l e e n d i a n ;
va l : case ( len ) of {
0xFFFFFFFF −> e : empty ;
0x00000000 −> f : empty ;
d e f a u l t −> name : b y t e s t r i n g &length=len ;
} ;
}
The precedent code listing describes a “QUALIFIED_NAME”, that is a specific data structure of OPC UA [48]. The logic
of the case statement says that if “len” is different from zero and “0xFFFFFFFF”, the parser will seek for a string of length
“len”, otherwise it will assure “len” is the last field of the structure.
Another important feature of Binpac is that the keyword “&let” allows to define dynamic variables for metadata definition.
It is possible to add them by using a graph brackets’ block, after the basic field definition. Refer to “opcua-protocol.pac”
for a concrete example.
Important functionality of Binpac is the possibility to specify the byte ordering to simple or complex types. Two basic
byte orders that the author used are the classical “bigendian” and “littleendian”, but for OPC UA, basically everything is
in “littleendian”.
The “&length” keyword lets you define the length of a “bytestring” or of a “record”. In the OPC UA standard, the field
“length” always precede a string to inform of its length [48]. More often, strings are terminated with a “NULL” or “CRLF”
in network protocols. In the case a “CRLF” is used as terminator, the attribute “&oneline” can be used to describe the
dynamic extent of a “bytestring”. The length of a string can also be the result of an arithmetical operation of other fields
and parameters, in fact, in the definition of “OPCUA_HELLO”, the “end_point_url” is defined based on the message size
minus all the other headers except the string.
“opcua-analyzer.pac” contains several “refine” statements that add callbacks to generate run-time Bro events. The “refine”
statement is also used to add globally usable function in the context of the OPC UA plug-in. In the same file there is
“C++” code that generates the Bro events. Note that the “C++” code is contained between “%{” and “%}” symbols.
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This syntax is necessary in order to instruct the Binpac compiler to behave accordingly. The “BifEvent” function is invoked
when generating Bro events. The methods are static and follow a common rule: each is named “generate”, followed by the
name of the event. Before calling them from “C++” they must be formally defined in the “events.bif” source file. This kind
of sources are simply Bro code for the definition of the events (“events.bif”) or of the types used (“types.bif”). Note that
only a prototype for the types is provided in “types.bif”. The comprehensive definition of the OPC UA structures belonging
to the plug-in are under “$BRO_PATH/scripts/base/init-bare.bro”. This file can be used to add custom environmental
definitions (functions, data structures, enumerations, etc..) for the Bro programming.
By observing the various source files of the plug-in, it is possible to note that “opcua-analyzer.pac” is the one that contains
most of the “C++” code with “opcua-convert.pac”. Its purpose is to link OPC UA packets to callbacks that, when fired,
will generate Bro events. This file also contains helper functions in “C++” that are used to correctly generate structures
to pass to the Bro policy scripts environment. Note that passing the parameters directly in the event generation is not
possible; events must be defined in “events.bif” before being used in “opcua-analyzer.pac”. “types.bif” instead define
prototypes for the types needed during the event generation. The full definition code for the OPC UA types has been
added to “init-bare.bro”.
“opcua-convert.pac” contains all the “C++” functions that will be used at runtime by the parser every time it will succeed
to parse a valid OPC UA packet to convert its data to valid Bro scripts data structures like records and vectors of the
appropriate type. The code in the source at issue might look boring and repetitive but is how Binpac and Bro scripts are
basically interfaced. That code, allocates new structures of Bro types and fill them with the freshly parsed values so that
then an event can be generated and the structures juts created can be passed to it.
To define a useful set of API to be used by Bro scripts it is not straightforward. First, events has to be prototyped in the
appropriate file. Then, types used in the events has to be prototyped in the types file. Finally, types definitions have to be
written comprehensively in the “init-bare.bro”, so that when Bro loads up it has the types loaded in the “OPCUA” module.
Furthermore, “opcua-analyzer.pac”, includes “opcua-convert.pac”, that fundamentally defines all the conversion routines
to interface the Binpac parser and the Bro policy script framework. To successfully achieve this task, a special set of API
provided by Bro is used. The author succeeded in correctly parsing integers, unsigned integers, booleans, strings, dates and
handled the creation of structures, to give complete access of the data to Bro policy scripts.
To give a general overview and understanding of Binpac code, the following listing includes the definition of the
“OPCUA_MESSAGE” from “opcua-message.pac” file of the plug-in:
type MESSAGE() = record {
type_ id : u int8 [4] &byteorder=l i t t l e e n d i a n ;
content : case ( type_ id [3] | ( type_ id [2] << 8) ) of {
SECURE_CHANNEL_REQUEST −> open_secure_channel_request :
OPEN_SECURE_CHANNEL_REQUEST;
SECURE_CHANNEL_RESPONSE−> open_secure_channel_response :
OPEN_SECURE_CHANNEL_RESPONSE;
PUBLISH_REQUEST −> pub l i sh_ reques t :
OPCUA_PUBLISH_REQUEST ;
PUBLISH_RESPONSE −> publ i sh_response :
OPCUA_PUBLISH_RESPONSE ;
CLOSE_SECURE_CHANNEL −> close_secure_channe l : OPCUA_CLOSE_CHANNEL;
BROWSE_REQUEST −> browse_request :
OPCUA_BROWSE_REQUEST;
BROWSE_RESPONSE −> browse_response :
OPCUA_BROWSE_RESPONSE;
READ_REQUEST −> read_reques t :
OPCUA_READ_REQUEST;
READ_RESPONSE −> read_response :
OPCUA_READ_RESPONSE;
WRITE_REQUEST −> wr i t e_ reques t :
OPCUA_WRITE_REQUEST;
WRITE_RESPONSE −> wri te_response :
OPCUA_WRITE_RESPONSE;
CREATE_SUBSCR_REQUEST −> s u b s c r i p t i o n _ r e q u e s t :
OPCUA_CREATE_SUBSCR_REQUEST;
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CREATE_SUBSCR_RESPONSE −> subsc r ip t i on_ re sponse :
OPCUA_CREATE_SUBSCR_RESPONSE;
GET_ENDPOINTS_REQUEST −> get_endpo in t s_ reques t :
OPCUA_GET_ENDPOINTS_REQUEST;
GET_ENDPOINTS_RESPONSE −> get_endpoints_response :
OPCUA_GET_ENDPOINTS_RESPONSE;
d e f a u l t −>
not_parsed : empty ;
} ;
}
It is possible to observe that the data structure “MESSAGE” is defined as a type, that is basically a sequential collection
of fields that have other types. A message might be of several types, in fact the “case” statment identifies the distinction
between the different OPC UA types. Note that the “case” construct uses the “type_id” field to determine the type of the
“content” field. If, for example, a packet “type_id” matches the “SECURE_CHANNEL_REQUEST” value, then the parsing
will proceed by taking “OPCUA_SECURE_CHANNEL_REQUEST” as type of the field and therefore as the next structure to
be parsed. The Binpac code in the end consists of formal definitions that formally describe the expected packet structures.
For a raw, comprehensive definition of the supported types refer to “opcua-types.pac”
One of the most basic functionalities of IEC 62541 are the “OpenSecureChannel” and “CloseSecureChannel” services.
Citing the sixth document of the standard: “These Services specify how to establish a Secure Channel and how to apply
security to Messages exchanged over that Secure Channel” [48]. These two services are fundamental to open secure
communications between OPC UA hosts. Following, the content of the “opcua-request.pac” file, that contains the formal
definition of the “OpenSecureChannel” request.
type OPEN_SECURE_CHANNEL_REQUEST() = record {
header : REQUEST_HEADER;
c l i e n t _ p r o t o c o l _ v e r s i o n : uint32 ;
se cu r i t y_ token_ reques t _ t ype : uint32 ;
message_security_mode : uint32 ;
c l i en t_nonce : STRING ;
r e q u e s t _ l i f e t i m e : uint32 ;
}
type REQUEST_HEADER() = record {
authen t i ca t ion_ token : NODE_ID ;
timestamp : uint64 ;
request_handle : uint32 ;
r e t u r n _ d i a g n o s t i c s : uint32 ;
aud i t _en t r y_ id : uint32 ;
t imeout_h int : uint32 ;
add i t iona l_header : u int8 [3] ;
}
The previous code also defines the type “REQUEST_HEADER”, that is used in almost all the OPC UA requests. However,
the main definition of the file is the type of packet that is sent when a client wants to establish a secure channel to a
server. It is straightforward to note that the structure at issue is pretty short and it only contains integers, except for
the “client_nonce” field, that is a variable length string. Furthermore, the “OPEN_SECURE_CHANNEL_REQUEST” is also
referred in a successive section, 3.2.5, in which a potential vector for DoS outbreaks in described.
The plug-in is organized so that Binpac source files are of a short length each so that most of them can be visualized in
just one screen without the need to scroll. The files are named as the services or messages they implement. Some source
just defines enumerations that will be used to distinguish the different OPC UA packets’ types, while, other files contain
conversion function to pass data from the OPC UA plug-in to the Bro policy script framework.
A critical issue in the parser development is the testing for robustness, because memory corruption flaws nested in the
program would set the right conditions for exploitations of the aforesaid vulnerabilities by anybody that wants to take
down or control the NIDS. To test robustness, exception logging has been employed, to detect malformed packets that
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might be source of an attack, or simply packets not recognized by the parser. To give as much coverage as possible during
the testing all the available packets will be given in input to the parser to check its behavior.
Performances are also important because if bad enough they can compromise the robustness of the system (Bro’s packets
queues might exhaust memory). However, in this project, good performances should be inherited by default from the
favorable Binpac’s performances, discussed in section 2.3.3. Binpac was implemented to fulfill features such as robustness
and performances, but as a user of Binpac, the author had to evaluate the effectiveness of the security and performances
of the system. That will be discussed in section 3.3.
3.2.2 Compilation
The process of compilation must first turn Binpac sources into valid “C++” code to then embed it as a plug-in in Bro
at compilation time. Bro is designed to have different directories for each plug-in. To initialize a new extension, with
its own files and folders, it is necessary to invoke the “binpac_quickstart” tool [2]. After termination, there will be two
directories, named as the plug-in, for the sources presented in section 3.1.1 and in the parser directory there will be a
“CMakeLists.txt” file to configure the compilation process.
There are two compilation steps that must be achieved to have a working Bro plug-in:
• Compile Binpac to “C++” (with Binpac)
• Compile Bro with new plug-in (with GCC)
In the first one there might occur errors generated by the Binpac compiler and strictly related to its own syntax and
lexicon. Once the plug-in is compiled, it is necessary to invoke GCC to build Bro and incorporate the new plug-in. The
second compilation step is usually more complex because the “C++” code written in the Binpac sources is validated at
this time and it is generally more error prone. The “C++” code is more subject to mistakes because it has to deal with
Bro API to generate events and feed them with appropriate Bro types. Therefore, is a part of the process where it is easy
to generate a compile time type error. The developer needs to get acquainted with the “C++” types and the surrounding
API to avoid mistakes.
In the parser’s folder there is a file named as the plug-in, that is usually named as the protocol to parse. The aforesaid file,
in this plug-in, is “opcua.pac” and it is the root of the Binpac’s compilation process. It includes the basic files needed: Bro’s
types and events, the Binpac analyzer and the protocol definition file. The BiF files have “.bif” extension and contains
code very similar to the Bro code with a slightly different syntax. “events.bif” defines the events that the plug-in will
pass to the Bro policy script interpreter while “types.bif” defines the additional Bro structures introduced to be used as
parameters in the events (otherwise, passing non-complex types all the time would result in very long lists of parameters,
ruining the code readability and maintainability). “opcua-protocol.pac” contains the formal definition of “OPCUA_PDU”,
from which all the other packet structures will be derived. “opcua-analyzer.pac” contains the needed function primitives
that bind callbacks that will be fired on successful parsing of OPC UA messages. Those callbacks will then generate Bro
events using Bro’s API.
To compile the Binpac sources it must be invoked the Binpac compiler by providing in input the main source file,
“opcua.pac”. To compile, it is also needed to give it the include directory. The final command is:
binpac − I $BRO_PATH/src opcua.pac
In case of errors, Binpac will try to inform the user about the problem with explanatory messages. Once the above
command succeed, the OPC UA Binpac source folder will also contain “C++” code, result of the Binpac compilation.
Now it is time to include the new analyzer in Bro. To do that the compilation process must be executed one more in the
“$BRO_SOURCE_PATH”, where also the plug-in described in this thesis is nested. To achieve that, a simple command
from the source root directory is required:
make
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It is possible to observe that “cmake” will cleverly skip all the files that have not been altered, while the freshly modified
OPC UA plug-in will get compiled and embedded in the Bro structure. This happens because the plug-in folder contains
a “CMakeLists.txt” file and cmake is programmed to seek for directives in it. After compiling the plug-in related file,
“cmake” will link the Bro executable and then it will be possible to install it in the system by typing:
sudo make instal l
Or just use it from the build, “$BRO_SOURCE_PATH/build/src/bro”.
To summarize: the user should first compile the Binpac source, then he should compile the generated “C++” sources in
the Bro compilation to get the plug-in to run. The final result is Bro executable with OPC UA support. At this point, the
user can run Bro with some policy scripts, to make NIDS analysis.
Note that the author also provides a script to compile, link and embed the final work. Furthermore, it is important the
the following steps are respected during the compilation and incorporation of the plug-in.
• Compile Binpac source to “C++”
• Compile “C++” into machine code
• Install or link the new Bro executable
• Copy the necessary Bro’s init scripts from the developing folder to the system installation path
• Run Bro with custom OPC UA policy scripts in input
The script provided by the author complies with the installation procedure. But it requires the user to modify the bash
variables in the first lines of code to define the Bro’s source location and installation path. Refer to appendix A for the
integral “BASH” script to compile and install the plug-in.
Note that while the Binpac sources are all grouped under the same directory, the Bro policy scripts are spread because
of the Bro structure. In the default OPC UA policy directory there are functions that log the events to log files. In “init-
bare.bro” there are basic structure definitions that are used to generate the parameters of the API (events) passed to
running Bro scripts. Furthermore, user-defined custom Bro programs can also be provided and executed by the final user.
Bro scripts do not need to be compiled to run. As previously stated, there is an open project, from the Bro community
that aims at writing a binary compiler for Bro scripts [6]; but for the moment the efficient interpreter is the only working
solution to run policy scripts.
3.2.3 Bro policy scripts
Bro policy scripts are the instrument used to implement the core network intrusion detection mechanism. Theoretically,
these scripts are arbitrary Turing complete programs written in the Bro programming language. Practically, these will
always tend to implement anomaly or signature based detection of specific attacks, or, they might also log transient
information.
Upon the OPC UA plug-in written in Binpac, discussed in section 3.2.1, it becomes possible to write Bro policy scripts.
They will receive events with structured data from the OPC UA parser. This interface is developer friendly because it
simplify the job of writing policy scripts. Without such a mechanism it would be necessary to write the parser from
scratch.
To support the definition of significant security policies this work integrates detection examples to identify attacks dis-
covered during the security analysis of the OPC UA server official reference implementation conducted by the federal
information office of the German government in 2015 [49].
It is important to note that the security analysis made by the information office only covers the official server and client
reference implementations (written in “C”) and the relative network stack [49]. Main issues identified by the research
were: problems related with inconsistencies between the official documentation and the implementation. That might
arise security issues as well as not; and bugs related to programming errors, therefore issues regarding the reference
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implementation. Those mistakes in the code are more or less dangerous depending on the context, but it has to be
pointed out that DoS attacks, are the most common form of outbreak to perform in this context. Even if an attacker does
not know how to perfectly exploit a memory corruption vulnerability to control a crash on the target machine he can still
use out-of-bounds read and write to make, i.e., the OPC UA server to read and write areas of memory unmapped in its
address space and consequently get killed by the operating system [49]. The reference implementation of the server at
issue is particularly delicate because written in “C” and hence subject to memory corruption issues on pointer handling
errors.
On a security perspective, outbreaks can target OPC UA servers by sending malformed packets. Basically, if the server
is deceived into reading or writing out of the buffer it dynamically allocated that will result in buffer overflows. Those
flaws, can be exploited to make DoS attacks or to take over machines. From the security analysis on OPC UA, around
400 crashes were identified and analyzer with valgrind during the tests [49]. To detect malicious packets, the author
employs an anomaly detection mechanism based on catching exceptions. There might be several cases where a packet
is erroneous, it also have to consider the case in which the packet is malformed so that it contains wrong length of for
example strings or arrays contained in it. In that case, the Binpac parser will fail to find a valid structure for the packet
and it will throw an exception that will be displayed on screen or potentially it could also be conveyed elsewhere.
On a goal perspective, detecting malformed packets as well as those that looks valid but contain an attack payload is
important to monitor for outbreaks. Another application of anomaly and intrusion detection, in the context of OPC UA
is the chance to compare a reference implementation to the official, public standard. That has also been parto of the
security analysis of OPC UA [49].
The network intrusion detection system can be used for different purposes that can be grouped as follows:
• Detect attacks
• Notice deviations respect to the standard
• Data processing
This section discusses about the issue of implementing Bro scripts to achieve the goal of defining security policies.
Achieving such a task with the Bro language is easier compared to other languages because it was made for that [61].
Bro is a security policies programming language that other than being Turing complete, it supports constructs typical
of every imperative programming language like “if”, “while”, “function”, etc. As discussed is section 2.2.3, the language
supports variables, as well as constants and all the other feature of modern programming languages.
Bro scripts are simple and powerful. For example, it is easy to keep track of the state of a connection by associating
runtime variables with it. Distinguishing connections is also straightforward because Bro provides a “connection” typed
parameter by default in each event. The following snippet of code defines a table that will use addresses as keys and
unsigned integers as values.
global my_table : table[addr] o f count;
Then, the aforesaid structure can be used for example to count the number of sent messages by a certain host. It is also
possible to change the “count” typed variable to some more complex data structure to associate more information with
the address.
For example it is possible to define a structure designed to store the hosts with which a certain system exchanged
information.
global my_connect ions : table[addr] o f set[addr];
Then the structure can be updated whenever a new TCP connection is establish, or some other event inform us of a
digital communication going on between two hosts.
Bro scripts support the use of regular expressions to quickly check presence of patterns in strings. To clarify syntax and
usage it follows an example from [10]:
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/ f oo|bar/ == “ f oo“
Gives true, while:
/ˆoob/ in “ f oobar“
Returns false. Another straightforward Bro functionality is the availability of key words to quickly write to specific log
files custom structures: For example:
Log :: create_st ream(Opcua :: LOG, [$columns = In f o, $ev = log_opcua, $path= “opcua“]);
Will create a log file (or opens it if already existing) that will be updated by the log_opcua event. The path instead
specifies the file name, while the first paramenter informs about which structure the log file will have. Therefore, using
this simplifications it becomes possible to implement custom and flexible logging strategies quickly.
To write on the create log stream, a simple call is enough:
Log :: write(Opcua :: LOG, in f o);
All the files in “$BRO_PATH/scripts/base/protocols/opcua/” are the base OPC UA security policy scripts that are automat-
ically loaded during each Bro execution if the “opcua” module is enabled in the configuration file. Those files are useful
for setting basic data processing operations like to log targeted information or also to record everything. Potentially it is
possible to implement all the policies in the base directory but it is not mandatory in any sense. It is better to develop
several modules but with a precise goal, dividing the functionalities by pertinence.
OPC UA is used in ICS and IoT. DoS attacks on the industry are yet rare but very hard to recover from. Stopping
production machineries or even destroying them might cost millions of Euro. Consequently, this document will mainly
concentrate on detecting DoS attacks identified by [49], while not forgetting to also include examples to detect deviations
from the specifications.
In the next sections are discussed some examples of detection techniques implemented during this thesis.
3.2.4 Incorrect sequence numbers
As stated in [49], the OPC UA server tested during the analysis behaved by accepting incorrect sequence numbers. This,
should trigger a transport error [48] pag. 39.
The security analysis on OPC UA [49] at section 8.9 proposes therefore a Proof of Concept (PoC) of a replay attack based
on the fact that the server accept messages with wrong sequence numbers as a follow-up to the project.
If an attacker exploits this flaw, he might be able to exhaust the server resources by replay attacking the victim server
with packets that the attacker knows or suppose they will provoke a high resource consumption in the server and he did
eavesdropped in the past. In this way a DoS outbreak can be easily achieved. But an attacker might also be able to bring
a connection into fatal errors by sending recorder packets twice or more times, depending on the implementation of the
server.
Replay attacks are all based on the concept that if there is no proper mechanism in place, an attacker with eavesdropping
capabilities might record the packets sent from the clients, replay them in the future and get them accepted by the
server. What is required to prevent replay attacks is some mechanism to make packets uniquely valid or at least, very
difficult to reuse for an external wiretapper. Examples of solutions are sequence numbers, that must match the supposed
value otherwise the packet gets discarded. Furthermore, sequence numbers have to be enforced with proper encryption
and authentication mechanisms as well. Nonces are also useful to generate fresh signatures or Message Authentication
Codes (MAC) of the content that must be proved to come from a certain sender [45]. A tuple made by: message,
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nonce and sequence number, where the message is arbitrary, the nonce is stochastically unique and the sequence number
is periodically repeated will give every time different signatures if signed with a fixed asymmetric private key. If that
signature is then actually verified by the server, then replay attacks are basically prevented.
Nonetheless, for the flaw at issue, as a detection mechanism, it is possible to realize a relatively simple policy script
that per each connection monitors that the sequence numbers are actually sequential, otherwise it raises an alert. It is
possible to achieve that by keeping a table in memory with the current maximum sequence number per each connection.
To identify the specific link, it uses the tuple that identifies the TCP connection, that is made up of IP and ports of the
connected hosts.
global max_sequence_number : table[conn_id] o f count;
And then it is possible to check when there is a message of type “MSG”, if the sequence number is the successor of the
received one. The script implement four data structures that are required to keep track of all the necessary information.
The first one identifies per each connection, the highest sequence number received, while the other keeps track for each
connection, any pair of sequence number, request identifier is saved, so that the script knows which couples of requests
and responses have been already sent. This is important because a client may send multiple sequential requests from a
single TCP socket to a server, while expecting to get all the valid responses back with same sequence number and request
identifier that it associated with them. Refer to appendix B for the whole script.
The script does also detect when requests are sent instead of responses and also the other way around. Note also that
the code manages the “HEL” typed message, that is used to establish communications. Indeed, that the event reset the
state of sequence numbers, requests and responses associated with the connection. The code listed also keeps track of
request response pairs, to give more information during the logging and to detect if wrong type of messages are sent.
The routine implemented in the “bro_done” event checks if for each request a response has been received. If the program
detects incomplete pairs, it notices that by logging to the standard output.
The script uses two different tables: one to store the current sequence number per each connection and the other to keep
in memory a boolean for each connection, that identifies if a certain sequence number has already been seen. This is
necessary because in OPC UA, the sequence numbers should match on request response pair; while different requests
responses have disparate sequence numbers.
The logic of the script is not too complex and the comments should help the reader in understanding the implemented
logic. The script basically keeps track for each connection of the maximum sequence number, in “max_sequence_number”
and it also tracks each request response pair in “sequence_numbers”. The logic is the following: if a message is a request,
update the relative structure, then, check if the sequence number is valid, if true, update the relative structure, otherwise
report the error. If it is a response, update the corresponding structure. If it receives a pair for which request and response
have already been sent for that connection, report the error.
Note that the code implements an event that function as an API from the parser as already discussed in section 2.2.2. To
get further information on events, see appendix D. To discover the structure of the “params” argument of the event, or of
other parameters with custom types, refer to appendix C.
By putting the code in appendix B in a file named with extension “.bro” and giving it as final argument when running Bro
with the OPC UA plug-in loaded will analyze all the OPC UA traffic using the provided policy scripts. Note that is also
possible to load other scripts in Bro source using the keyword “load”.
This first example, accomplishes the goal of detecting inconsistencies in the sequence numbers, practically applying a
security policy. But, there are other ways to implement the concept that may reduce or increase the log produced by the
script based on varying needs. Also note that some scripts might need to be calibrated depending on the network on
which they need to run. Scripts that detect DoS attacks in general are more prone to produce false positives and therefore
require careful configuration.
Detecting packets with invalid sequence number is a PoC that Bro policy scripts can be used to enforce the security
policies by providing smart monitoring of the network flow and therefore the possibility to stand by for attacks, or also,
to supervise OPC UA implementations to reveal deviations from the standard.
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3.2.5 HEL flooding
Section 7.2 of the security analysis of OPC UA discusses several potential threats to the protocol [49]. All the findings has
been classified using several criteria in a Common Vulnerabilities Scoring System (CVSS) style. Factors taken into account
were: Access Vector (AV) as well as Access Complexity (AC), Authentication (Au), Confidentiality Impact, Integrity
Impact, Availability Impact, Exploitability [49]. Then, based on the likeliness, impact and the other characteristics, each
flaw was given a score between 0.7 to 8.5 [49].
The vulnerability at focus on this section was named “HEL flooding” because during the security analysis, they discovered
that if the clients repeatedly send “HEL” messages to the server, it will reply with an “ACK” for each one. That behavior is
not the correct one as specified in the documentation, therefore, the impact of the vulnerability has been classified as a
potential DoS attack because it provokes high network load and low processor load [49]. The vulnerability is present in
all the security modes of OPC UA. The final CVSS score given during the security analysis was 5.2 [49].
The server behavior is incorrect because while it should drop the repeating “HEL” messages, it instead normally reply to
with an “ACK” per each one, therefore consuming resources and giving space for a DoS breach.
To detect “HEL” flooding with a Bro script it is pretty straightforward. The following listing shows the very short script
the author wrote for this purpose.
module OPCUA;
#max number of HEL from each IP
const th resho ld : count = 10;
const t imelapse : i n t e r v a l = 10 sec ;
g loba l account_he l lo : t a b l e [ addr ] of count &wr i t e_exp i r e=t imelapse ;
event opcua_hel lo_event ( c : connection , params : connect ion_parameters , end_point_ur l :
s t r i n g ) {
i f ( c$ id$or ig_h in account_he l lo )
account_he l lo [ c$ id$or ig_h]+=1;
e l s e
account_he l lo [ c$ id$or ig_h ]=1;
i f ( account_he l lo [ c$ id$or ig_h]>thresho ld )
p r i n t fmt ( " Flooding from : %s " , c$ id$or ig_h ) ;
}
The core idea here is that it is possible to log how many “HEL” messages a certain IP is sending to any server. If more
than “threshold” requests are issues during a “timelapse” interval, then Bro will notify the likely flooding.
The constants in the script can be calibrated based on the network in which the monitor has to run in. Furthermore, in
the listed code, the logic divides requests by IP so that it takes into account the behavior of different hosts. It could be
modified to set a global “HEL” threshold and not only a limit per each client.
3.2.6 Version mismatch
During the security analysis of OPC UA steered by the German government, they discovered several inconsistencies
between the standard and the implementation and they also found specific flaws in existing OPC UA software. In section
8.6.3, the ninth point lists a finding that basically consists in the fact that the official OPC UA server implementation
did accepted “OPEN_SECURE_CHANNEL_REQUEST” with protocol version different than the one that was sent in the
“HELLO” message [49]. This does not correspond to the specifications and hence can be considered a deviation from the
normal, standard behavior and therefore, an anomaly. It might imply the malfunctioning of the communication because
of protocol incompatibility.
Even if this is not an actual security problem, it is possible to write a simple detection script, based on the API described
in the appendix D. To detect versions mismatch the author implemented a Bro script that matches the version from the
“HELLO” message to the one that aims at opening the secure connection. This script can be useful to detect the anomaly
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at issue. If detected, then the reference implementation can be fixed to prevent the server from accepting mismatching
version values. Following, the script at issue:
module OPCUA;
g loba l h e l l o s _ v e r s i o n : t a b l e [ conn_id ] of count ;
event opcua_hel lo_event ( c : connection , params : connect ion_parameters , end_point_ur l :
s t r i n g ) {
h e l l o s _ v e r s i o n [ c$id ] = params$version ;
}
event opcua_open_secure_channel_response_event ( c : connection , header : response_header ,
s e r v e r _ p r o t o c o l _ v e r s i o n : count , s e cu r i t y_ token : secur i t y_ token , server_nonce :
s t r i n g ) {
i f ( h e l l o s _ v e r s i o n [ c$id ] != s e r v e r _ p r o t o c o l _ v e r s i o n )
p r i n t fmt ( " Mismatch between ve r s i on s in HEL msg and OPEN_SECURE_CHANNEL_REQUEST in
%s " , c$id ) ;
}
3.2.7 Memory leak with NodeId decoding
During the security analysis of OPC UA, more than 400 error messages had been caught in Valgrind [49].
A DoS vulnerability identified and listed in section 8.7.1 of the security analysis was found in the function
“OpcUa_BinaryDecoder_ReadNodeIdBody()”. The bug laid on the fact that the code was not handling correctly the freeing
of memory associated to the “node_id” typed variable if an error occurred during the decoding, therefore generating
memory leaks in RAM [49]. In fact, if a malformed packet with a “node_id” that declares it contains a string of a certain
length but actually it does not because it terminates previously, the non-patched server will allocate space on the heap for
the string but will not free it during the handling of the parsing error. Repeating this attack would trigger total memory
consumption on the vulnerable server, therefore blocking the service.
To detect this outbreak it is necessary to have Bro with the plug-in and patches developed in this project to process the
OPC UA malformed packets and print the exceptions. If the message error gets generated by and out-of-bound case, on
a “node_id” typed value, then, Bro processed one of those malformed packets.
3.2.8 Malformed packets detection
An important feature of the OPC UA parser, core of this project, is that it manages automatically errors with indexes,
bounds and other kind of problems by raising exceptions [64]. The author, created a patch that is automatically applied
after having generated the parser by the building script. The patch at issue adds prints of the caught exceptions, so that
if there is a problem it can be detected and debugged. Another major advantage of printing exceptions is that it becomes
possible to detect malformed packets that the parser failed to parse. A reference implementation of OPC UA client or
server that does not successfully handle the exception as the Binpac parser would therefore crash or behave unexpectedly.
Figure 15 shows how Wireshark display malformed packets:
Figure 15: Wireshark OPC UA malformed packet
Figure 16 instead shows how Bro with the plug-in developed in this project with the applied patch detects and inform
about the malformed packet.
The Bro exception message is more informative, in fact, it is possible to understand in which type the exception
was thrown, for which reason and on which field. In the example, the parser fails during the reading of an “AR-
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Figure 16: Bro detects OPC UA malformed packet
RAY_OF_STRING”, while parsing the “array_index” field. The message informs us also on how many bytes the parser
expected to read (4) and how many it actually had available on the buffer (0).
OPC UA is used in the ICS and IoT fields. DoS attacks are frightening for the industry because even in the case of medium
size farms, the losses for the interruption of the machineries may sum up to huge amounts. An example of ICS malware
discovered back in June 2010 was the Stuxnet malware. It was a carefully designed piece of software that infected more
than 14 industrial sites in Iran among which an uranium-enrichment plant. It was designed to scan Windows systems for
Siemens Step7 software after installation. Then it basically used the Step7 software to program industrial machineries
such as centrifuges by compromising the PLC, actually taking over the machine. It was used to spy on the industry as well
as to destroy centrifuges by making them spin too fast [37]. In IoT, DoS attacks are not as powerful as in the industry.
What happens instead is that IoT devices themselves are exploited to drive flooding based DoS attacks. In fact IoT devices
have already been used to create botnets and steer Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), i.e. in the case of the “Mirai”
malware that created one of the biggest botnets ever [56]. The unfortunate lack of security, the quantity of IoT devices
and their accessibility through the network makes them a perfect target for cyber criminals.
Detecting malformed packet is useful to understand when attempts of crashing or controlling OPC UA machines are in
course. This kind of activity is typical of cyber security employees that have the goal of monitoring and protecting the
IT systems. When an exception is caught, a message saying which kind of rejection has been identified is printed. To
investigate further of where the malformation lays, it would be ideal to log the whole deformed packet (reassembling
chunks if necessary) and further inspect it by adding log information to the Bro source code, or using Wireshark or other
tools to understand what is wrong with it. However, the danger of a malformed packet is real only when it brings some
reference implementation to crashes or to experience anomalies during the execution.
To test that the parser written during this thesis detect malformed packets, the author generated minimal “pcap” files that
have erroneous structure. When testing Bro with the OPC UA plug-in loaded and malformed OPC UA packets in input,
it will throw an “out_of_bound”, or akin exception and it will print its details on screen. It might be that the malformed
packets at issue might trigger vulnerabilities in some OPC UA reference implementation. Bugs in parsing have been
repetitively used as vectors to drive memory corruption attacks.
Memory corruption issues are usually correlated with array pointers that exceed the bounds of allocated memory to read
or write. In some cases an attacker might be able to decide exactly the locations he wants to override because of a direct
control on an unsafe pointer, anyway there should be a level of indirection added by the Address Space Randomized
Layout (ASRL) that function as a barrier to prevent memory corruption attacks to succeed in getting arbitrary code
execution.
In 2014, one of the worst vulnerabilities identified and disclosed to the public was “Heartbleed”, a flaw in the core of
the open Secure Socket Layer (SSL) library [17]. The bug was a variable length information disclosure, till 64KB [16],
dictated by an out-of-bound read that the server naively performed on certain requests to provide a response. The issue
of this memory disclosure was estimated as critical because it exposed the private SSL signing key of the server as well
as the other contents of memory such as messages and other keys. Substantially, a remote unauthenticated attacker was
able to exploit CVE-2014-0160 to get the private key of the server with which an attacker could impersonate the server
therefore threatening each secure communication established to it. Heartbleed was exactly the kind of vulnerability
related to out-of-bound reads during parsing, something that the SSL server should have handled well but did not.
Every developer should be aware and avoid those kind of vulnerabilities in the future. Usual parsing errors like bounds
checking can escalate into world wide critical bugs that can compromise most of the ongoing secure communications. It
should be known, nowadays, especially to computer scientists, IT engineers and programmers in general that computers
are weird machines in the sense that sometimes they do not behave as they were expected to. Memory corruption issues
are one of the oldest class of programming errors but they do still affect modern computer systems because the problem
has not been removed but requires careful programming and intense testing in memory unsafe languages like “C/C++”
to be avoided. Furthermore, security tests in form of fuzzing, white, black or gray box testing are good tools to verify
that a software behaves as it is supposed to.
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3.3 Evaluation
This section evaluates the performances and robustness of the parser developed in section 3.2.1. Furthermore, the
detection scripts of sections 3.2.4, 3.2.5, 3.2.6, 3.2.7 are also evaluated in this section.
Different types of tests have been executed to evaluate effectiveness, performances and to stress test the parser and the
Bro’s detection scripts. All the test have been performed on a desktop machine with 8 gigabyte of RAM, an Intel(R)
Core(TM) i5-2400 CPU @ 3.10GHz quad-core Central Processing Unit (CPU) and Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS 64-bit.
3.3.1 Performances
To test the performances of the parser developed in this thesis, the author ran and measured the execution time of Bro
with the OPC UA plug-in loaded, giving in input the available packet capture files (PCAPs). To test the parser, files
containing OPC UA recorded packets are necessary. The author used three different PCAP files, one provided by the
Fraunhofer SIT institute and the other two were generated by the author using open reference implementations of OPC
UA client and server.
Table 1 describes the characteristics of the PCAP files used during the testing. It also includes information regarding the
size of the file, the lapse of time in seconds in which the PCAP was recorded and the total OPC UA payload in the file
(only the OPC UA data, excluding all the TCP, IP and data link’s headers). The total OPC UA payload has been calculated
using a modified version of the script in appendix F.
Table 1: PCAP files used in the performance evaluation
File # File size Recording lapse OPC UA PDU total payload
1 40KB 11 seconds 23.3KB
2 4.8MB 84 seconds 6.3KB
3 10.7MB 1086 seconds 559.62KB
The performances results have been split into two disparate tables to simplify the reading of the data. Table 2 shows the
performances of Bro parsing and analyzing different files in “normal configuration”. That means no change was made
to its settings and therefore all the default plug-ins contained in it were loaded. Each line corresponds to exactly one
executed test.
Table 2: Performance evaluation in normal configuration
File # Execution time (seconds) Bro configuration Policy script
1 0.560-0.580 Normal configuration test.bro
1 0.550-0.560 Normal configuration NONE
2 0.680-0.720 Normal configuration test.bro
2 0.680-0.720 Normal configuration NONE
3 2.180-2.200 Normal configuration test.bro
3 1.950-1.970 Normal configuration NONE
Table 3 contains the results of the performance test run with Bro in “minimal configuration”. The aforesaid setting
consists in running Bro with only the OPC UA plug-in loaded and therefore by not loading all the other plug-ins for the
rest of the supported application layer protocols. To achieve this configuration it is needed to edit the Bro settings file
that can be found under “$BRO_INSTALLATION_PATH/share/bro/base/init-default.bro”.
Table 3: Performance evaluation in minimal configuration
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File # Execution time (seconds) Bro configuration Policy script
1 0.330-0.350 Minimal configuration test.bro
1 0.330-0.350 Minimal configuration NONE
2 0.460-0.470 Minimal configuration test.bro
2 0.440-0.460 Minimal configuration NONE
3 1.000-1.030 Minimal configuration test.bro
3 0.460-0.470 Minimal configuration NONE
From table 2 and 3 it is possible to observe that the execution time shrinks substantially when Bro is in “minimal
configuration”. It is also possible to observe that Bro takes roughly only 100ms more when parsing a file 100 times
bigger (first couple versus second pair). Although, effectively, the OPC UA payload is diminished, Bro takes more time
to terminate the computation, because anyhow it has to process the packets (by skipping all the non OPC UA traffic
in minimal mode but still, processing them takes time). Moreover, it is also possible to deduce that Bro takes around
200ms to load up all the plug-ins it has to parse and setup the network intrusion detection system for all the supported
protocols because that is the concrete difference in time that there is between the same tests performed in “normal” and
“minimal” mode, except for the biggest tested file. This last test does reveal one second of execution time difference
between “normal” and “minimal” mode with the base policy script provided. The execution lapses probably differ so
much because of all the traffic of other protocols contained in the capture file at issue.
The column policy script indicates if during the tests a Bro program was given in input from the command line. “NONE”
means that no script was given. “test.bro” is the default security policy script that the author developed to test the
functionalities of the plug-in and it basically logs various information contained in the OPC UA traffic. Please refer to
appendix E to read the integral script. It is important to note that the presence of a simple policy script such as in this
case implies negligible execution time fluctuations in the first eight results of the table. Instead, when processing the last
file, which size is the greatest between the test capture files and also with the biggest amount of OPC UA PDU, the policy
script column make a real difference in the execution time. This because the amount of logging produced by the script
is, in this case, enormous and therefore the time taken by the logging itself results relevant.
Last but not least, the table also states a recording lapse column, that identifies the interval of time in which the capture
file at issue was recorded in. The time lapses are much greater than the time that Bro takes to parse and analyze them.
This is good, because if Bro would not cope with the throughput of the network then it would loose its real-time analysis
capability and it could consume all the available memory by piling packets. Moreover, in case more performances are
required, a more powerful computer can be used, or it is even possible to run Bro on a cluster of servers [5].
The 40KB file was provided by the Fraunhofer SIT institute, while the 4.8MB file was generated by the author using the
“Ansi C” official reference implementation at [24] for the server and a client with Graphical User Interface (GUI) at [36].
The last capture file, of the size of 10.7MB was generated by a script wrote by the author to fuzz OPC UA packets and
therefore generate new samples. Also the counting of the OPC UA PDU payload was achieved by a script wrote by the
author.
3.3.2 Robustness
As already discussed, robustness is a critical feature of each software related with the computer networks or also programs
that runs with high privilges. Software that takes input from the network can be exploited by malicious actors to perform
attacks which possible goals might be: to break into the system, to crash the program, or to bypass it. This section is
dedicated at the testing of the robustness of the developed system.
The parser discussed in section 3.2.1 and 3.1.1 has been developed with Binpac and therefore it should be automatically
very robust. To prove empirically that the parser is effectively strong, the author manually crafted some malformed pack-
ets to test that the parser is actually able to detect the malformation without crashing. Furthermore, in this document,
especially in sections 3.2.8 and 3.2.7 are discussed the capability of detecting malformed packets by the parser and how
this feature can be used to detect anomalies and attacks.
Testing Bro with malformed packets effectively showed that the Binpac parser is actually robust. Looking at the “C++”
code generated by Binpac from the formal specifications gives an idea of how strong the performed checks are. Out of
bounds read and write operations are prevented by repetitive but necessary checks. As discussed in section 2.3, Binpac
automatically implements controls to verify that the information contained in the packet do not mislead the parser
into doing unauthorized operations (like reading from memory location zero). However, from the robustness testing,
it resulted that the API created by the author to interconnect Binpac with Bro were buggy. The discovered issues were
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related to functions contained in the file “opcua-convert.pac”. The aforesaid problematic functions were all related to
array conversion from the Binpac (“C++” environment) to the Bro policy scripts processor (interpreter setting).
The vulnerabilities were related to the fact that the code was assuming that the data structures passed to the conversion
functions were well formed because otherwise, Binpac should have managed the error by throwing an exception and
discarding the packet at issue. For example, consider the case in which a browse response OPC UA packet contains an
array of browse results that has an invalid array size, what actually happened is that Binpac did not threw any exception
but proceeded by passing the structured data to the event generator and then to the API (that is the actual data flow).
Manually reviewing the incriminated Binpac code revealed that it did effectively not threw out of bound exceptions in
such cases. As a solution the author implemented additional checks in each API function that manages Binpac arrays
(that are actually “C++” vectors). The additive controls verify that if a vector capacity (the space Binpac allocated for it,
because that was the size it was supposed to be) matches the effective vector size. If the check fails, then the code throws
an exception so that it will be caught and visualized on screen. In this context the author at first preferred to implement
the checks manually in the API. Later the author also reported the problem and a possible fix to the Binpac community.
Figure 17 contains a sample of code from the plug-in API (“opcua-convert.pac”) that manages the conversion of the parsed
browse results to the Bro policy script environment. Note that the code contains the additional checks just discussed to
prevent the improper usage of the vector object (out of the red square). Initially, before the patch, the original code was
only the one contained in the red square plus the first statement of the function. Furthermore, note that the code at issue
was buggy for the fact that the “for” cycle utilizes the “${array.array_size}” field to determine the exit condition. That
field might not match the real array length in some particular corner cases in which Binpac does not handle properly out
of bounds exceptions and just passes the data to the API routine. Finally, the purpose of the additional check is in fact to
manage the missed Binpac exception. Furthermore, note that the code is “C++” with the Binpac’s syntax: “${...}” as a
shortcut to access the fields of the parsed structures.
Figure 17: Bug in the API
To test the robustness three different tests have been run with manually deformed PCAPs. The files were named
“malformed-1.pcapng”, “malformed-2.pcapng”, “malformed-3.pcapng”. Initially, the second and the third files were
generating a “segmentation fault” because the “C++” code in the API was sliding on the parsed array till a certain
length was reached. The problem laid on the fact that the length was not the real one of the array and therefore the
program was reading out of the bounds of the array, unallocated memory locations that brught him to dereferencing an
object at memory location zero. After the author deployed the patches to the API the problems were solved. Please refer
to appendix G for a detailed Valgrind log of the crash. Figure 18 depicts the output of the three tests run in sequence.
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Figure 18: Robustness tests
Note that the first malformed packet capture file has a “GetEndpointsRequest” that has the “LocaleIds” array of string
with invalid number of elements. Figure 19 depicts the packet loaded in Wireshark:
Figure 19: Wireshark malformed packet 1
The second has a read request packet that has an untrue size for the array of reads to perform. Wireshark’s packet
dissection follows:
Figure 20: Wireshark malformed packet 2
The third and last has corrupted length of the array of browse results. Figure 21 shows how Wireshark shows the
malformed packet:
No further crashes had happened, except for the problems related with arrays identified in this section. Therefore, the
system demonstrates to have robust execution in parsing OPC UA traffic by handling normal packets as well as the
malformed ones.
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Figure 21: Wireshark malformed packet 3
3.3.3 Sequence number script evaluation
The present master thesis described different security policy scripts that the author wrote to detect disparate kinds of
attacks. This section aims at evaluating the effectiveness of those scripts.
The first security policy script, discussed in section 3.2.4, assembles the logic to detect violations regarding the common
header of all the OPC UA messages of type “MSG”. Substantially, the checks involve controlling that the sequence numbers
of the packets are correct and that for each request there is a corresponding response. The logic can be summarized as
follows:
• Each different connection has a disparate, changing state
• Sequence numbers are sequentials, no number can be skipped
• Requests identifiers bind together request and response pairs
• Each request should have exactly one response
Violations to the listed rules produce alert messages from Bro. The printed log can also be conveyed from the standard
output of Bro to the email of the responsible administrator, technician, or member of the CERT, so that he is advised
as soon as possible. Furthermore, Bro already provide “Notice::ACTION_EMAIL” to send an email to the responsible
administrator. However, it might also be desirable to not use emails but some other communication mean, maybe more
real-time and secure. It is possible to achieve alluring solutions by reading and filtering the relevant messages from the
Bro output.
To test the script the author ran Bro on different instances, to verify that the desired behavior is correct. In this test the
author used the policy script at issue in this section as well as the PCAP file provided by the Fraunhofer SIT institute,
also used in section 3.3.1, that is a genuine capture file that comes from an actual factory. Running the detection script
with this PCAP from appendix B, Bro detects that at the end of the file there are two requests whose have no matching
response. That is true and a logical explanation for this fact is that at a certain point the process of recording packets to
make the capture file was interrupted and therefore some responses for already logged requests were cut off. The author
verified by hand that the requests were effectively with missing response.
Note that each test was run with the “time” command preceding Bro, therefore the outputs contain the time measure-
ments on the execution of Bro. Figure 22 shows the output of the first test:
The script correctly detects that the requests with identifiers 22 and 24 had no responses from the server.
The author performed two more tests to verify that the detection mechanism works properly. Manually deformed PCAPs
were used for the tests. The capture file used in this test was modified by tampering the sequence number and the request
identifier of one OPC UA packet from 52 to 68 and 2 to 18, respectively. Figure 23 shows the results on giving this capture
file, named “wrong_seq_num.pcapng” to Bro.
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Figure 22: Sequence number detection script - test 1
Figure 23: Sequence number detection script - test 2
The script detects that there is a response while a request was expected for that request identifier. It also reveals the
altered sequence number and the fact that in the end there are two incomplete request response pairs.
The last test was performed using another manually malformed OPC UA packet, but in this example, the only modified
value was the sequence number of an OPC UA packet, changed from 52 to 68. Figure 24 shows the correct output of Bro.
Figure 24: Sequence number detection script - test 3
The script detects the wrong sequence number and the two incomplete request response pairs.
The performed tests show that the developed script is effective in detecting violations of the sequence numbers security
policies. As discussed in the section, 3.2.4, the usage of wrong sequence numbers can be exploited by an attacker to forge
valid reply attacks because of the flaw identified in [49]. Therefore this policy script is useful to detect and take action
to prevent the successful exploitation by malicious actors.
3.3.4 HEL flooding script evaluation
One of the scripts presented in this thesis was the one that detects flooding of “HEL” messages, that is, those communica-
tion’s rawplug that the clients use to establish and setup an OPC UA connection with a server. The vulnerability, discussed
in section 3.2.5, is a non critical but still high rated vulnerability that attackers can exploit to temporarily compromise
the responsiveness of a server and therefore all the connected, ongoing communications [49]. Thus, this flaw could be
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exploited to threaten OPC UA conversations, on the local network as well as on the Internet. Thence, the author proposed
a NIDS script to detect this kind of attack. In this section its effectiveness is evaluated.
To test the security policy script, two different tests were run: one that does not contain any “HEL” flood, while the other
with a flood coming from a single host to a server. Both the tests were evaluated positively. To generate the flooding, the
author used an OPC UA client with graphical user interface and performed repetitive connections to the server so that
the client basically flooded it. Figure 25 portraits the detection script in action on the crafted capture file that actually
detects floodings of “HEL” messages from one host.
Figure 25: HEL flooding - test
3.3.5 Version mismatching evaluation
Another detection script proposed and implemented in the present document is the one that detects mismatching protocol
version between OPC UA clients and servers. The program logic is simple:
• Keep separate state per each connection
• Save in memory the client protocol version when it send an “HEL” message
• Verify that the server protocol version matches when it replies with an “OPN” message
This script proves that Bro policy scripts do not necessarily need to address a security problems but they can also be used
as a tool of analysis. This script in fact detects mismatching client server protocol versions. That is not an actual security
problem but a violation of the standard that might also lead to malfunctioning in specific conditions [49].
Figure 26 shows the successful test that the author ran the script against a manually modified packet with mismatching
client server protocol versions.
Figure 26: Version mismatching test
3.3.6 Malformed NodeId detection evaluation
In section 3.2.7, this thesis discussed the memory leak identified during the security analysis of OPC UA [49]. In this
section, the detection script implemented to reveal that kind of malformed packets is evaluated. The detection of that
kind of attack can be identified by the logging of the exceptions. The following picture shows the execution of Bro with
in input a packet with a malformed NodeId element contained in a read request. The aforesaid erroneous structure is a
NodeId that specify a string of false length, that is why the exception logs an out of bound in a “‘STRING” typed field.
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Figure 27: Malformed NodeId - test
Figure 28 is the dissection of the packet at issue in Wireshark:
Figure 28: Wireshark malformed NodeId
3.3.7 Summary of the evaluation
Section 3.3 has been allocated to discuss about the evaluation of the contributions committed by author. Section 3.3.1
showed and discussed the results of the performance evaluation. The outcome has been positive, but it has to be pointed
out that each network is different and the specific impact of running the system developed in this thesis needs thorough
testing and continuous monitoring because in case the NIDS gets overwhelmed by the network traffic, the whole reliability
of the system would get compromised.
Section 3.3.2 described the testing steered by the author to assess the robustness of the NIDS. A bugs has been found,
reported and fixed by the author regarding the Binpac compiler [1]. No other issues has been found.
Section 3.3.3 discussed the effectiveness of the script developed in section 3.2.4 to detect invalid sequence numbers
flowing in OPC UA network streams. The script has been successfully tested against manually modified PCAP files to
detect corrupted sequence numbers, request types, and request identifiers.
Section 3.3.4 positively evaluated the ‘HEL‘ flood detection script while section 3.3.5 postitively leaded the testing of the
version mismatch detection script. Finally, section 3.3.6 showed how the developed Binpac plug-in is capable of detecting
malformed packets crafted to exploit the memory leak vulnerability identified in the BSI analysis [49] discussed in section
3.2.7.
This thesis built a basic framework which purpose is to develop security policy scripts that can be used to process, in real-
time, OPC UA data monitored from computer networks and therefore steer analysis of attacks, inconsistencies with the
standard, bugs in the implementations and potentially other inventive purposes. This section has evaluated the achieved
accomplishments but is not an upper limit to the potentiality of the developed plug-in.
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4 Conclusion
Within this thesis the author presented and discussed the relatively new, open, OPC UA standard for M2M communica-
tions used in ICS and IoT (sections 1.2, 2.1.2, 2.1). It had then introduced and discussed the topic of NIDS, focusing
particularly on Bro and the reasons why it has been the preferred choice (sections 1.3, 2.2). In addition, a distinct section
has been dedicated to Binpac, a compiler for application layer network protocol parsers (section 2.3).
This paper then proceeded with the implementation, section 3.2, in which a plug-in for the Bro network intrusion
detection system has been developed to add the functionality of parsing OPC UA packets in Bro and therefore making it
possible to develop Turing complete security policy scripts in the Bro language to detect attacks, violations of the standard
or to implement other arbitrary analysis programs. Specifically, in section 3.1.1, it had been discussed the design of the
plug-in, while, section 3.2.1 has been dedicated to the actual implementation of the parser. Then, based on the developed
API, the author described and implemented disparate policy scripts in the Bro language to achieve tasks such as detecting
attacks revealed in [49], identifying malformed packets and revealing standard violations (sections 3.2.4, 3.2.5, 3.2.6,
3.2.7, 3.2.8).
Lastly, this thesis had discussed the evaluation of performances and robustness of the developed plug-in (sections 3.3.1,
3.3.2), as well as the effectiveness of the developed policy scripts through testing (sections 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.3.6).
In conclusion, Bro demonstrated to be a very flexible and powerful NIDS. Its ability to plug new modules to parse
unsupported protocols makes it really ductile and therefore adaptable to present and future network protocols. In
addition, Binpac proved to be a very powerful compiler and language to quickly build application layer protocol parsers
upon UDP and TCP. Though an issue was identified in Binpac (section 3.3.2), it has to be recognized that it is a great
instrument to build application layer network protocol parsers. Besides these observations, OPC UA is a relatively new
standard and the only public available security analysis, up to the author’s knowledge, is the one from the German
government and it has been referenced in the present work as a source of real attacks on OPC UA [49]. Furthermore, no
major outbreaks on OPC UA dependent machines had yet been discussed from the public, up to the author’s knowledge.
The importance of computer security continues to grow as the world is progressively more interconnected and because
of the unbound use of computers which are now involved in more parts of our own lives. In fact, the integration of
calculators in IoT, automotive applications and ICS increased recently [60] [21]. Though no relevant attacks on OPC
UA happened yet, it does not mean that they will never occur. In fact, the growing importance of IEC 62541 in the
industry could imply quite the opposite. Therefore, the plug-in developed in this thesis is valuable as it expands the Bro
NIDS on OPC UA. The tool developed in this work can be used as a basis to analyze in real-time OPC UA traffic flows
with arbitrarily defined policy scripts toward the purposes of detecting outbreaks, monitoring and safeguarding OPC UA
machines.
The main limitation of this work is the coverage of the standard achieved by the implementation. As discussed in 2.1,
IEC 62541 is a very wide and flexible standard, composed by 14 documents of formal specifications regarding packets
structure, semantic and supposed interpretation by OPC UA clients and servers. The present implementation covers
several OPC UA services and data structures but it does not provide comprehensive coverage of the standard. The
present work defines a possible solution on how the problem of making NIDS on OPC UA can be practically tackled.
It provides concrete solutions to detect discovered attacks [49] on an existing implementation [24]. Furthermore, the
solution is also able to detect malformed packets thanks to a fine-grained exception handling mechanism.
The key achievements of this paper are that the developed plug-in effectively unleashes the powerful policy script frame-
work processor on OPC UA traffic as this thesis describes in sections: 3.2.4, 3.2.5, 3.2.6, 3.2.7. More policy scripts can be
developed using this basic framework to detect attacks, standard violations, DoS attempts, malformed packets, Advanced
Persistent Thread (APT) and other potential abuses. Additionally, the author identified and fixed a programming error in
the Binpac software. The author also submitted the problem and solution in the Binpac community so that future crashes
will be prevented also for the other users [1].
Future work related to the present paper might target the expansion of the actual API code base of the current plug-in,
to support more services and structures of the IEC 62541 standard. Furthermore, in future parsers it will be possible
to use “binpac++”, the evolution of Binpac, that is unfortunately still under development [6]. With the advantages
of “binpac++” the efforts to develop a flexible and robust parser will shrink as more simplifications are being added
to save developers’ time, especially in the programming of the API for the Bro scripts. With “binpac++” the authors
aim at improving the process of developing software parsers by automating more operations. In fact, Binpac requires
the developer to write the conversion functions to pass the structured data to the Bro’s policy script engine, while,
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“binpac++” aims at automating this procedure and therefore the developer will have to manually write less code and
thence less errors.
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A Compile & install script
This section contains the original script that the author provided to compile and install the developed plug-in. The
language utilized is “BASH”. Furthermore, the user needs to modify the first lines with its own local paths. Moreover,
note that the script includes several checks to assure that Bro and Binpac are actually installed and the script terminates
in case of any error (e.g in the case of any compilation error from Binpac or GCC).
# Writ ten by Tomas B o r t o l i <tomasbortol i@gmail . com>
#
# Configure these v a r i a b l e s with your own paths
BRO_PATH=~/t b o r t o l i /sw/bro−2.5/
BRO_INSTALLATION_PATH=/usr / l o c a l / bro /
SRC=s r c / #don ’ t modify
ANALYZER_PATH=s r c / ana lyzer / pro toco l /opcua/ #don ’ t modify
s e t −e
echo " Checking ex i s t en c e of Binpac i n s t a l l a t i o n in / usr / bin / binpac . . "
i f [ [ ! −e / usr / l o c a l / bin / Binpac ]]
then echo " P lease i n s t a l l binpac " ; e x i t ;
f i
echo "Ok"
echo " Checking ex i s t en c e of bro d e f a u l t i n s t a l l a t i o n d i r e c t o r y . . "
i f [ [ ! −e / usr / l o c a l / bro ]]
then echo " P lease i n s t a l l Bro " ; e x i t ;
f i
echo "Ok"
s l eep 1
echo " Checking tha t bro con f i gu ra t i on inc lude the OPC UA analyzer . . "
check_conf ig =‘grep " @load base / p ro to co l s /opcua " " $BRO_INSTALLATION_PATH/ share /
bro / base / i n i t −d e f a u l t . bro " ‘
i f [ −z " $check_conf ig " ]
then echo " P lease add a l i n e conta in ing ’ @load base / p ro to co l s /opcua ’ in
$BRO_INSTALLATION_PATH/ share / bro / base / i n i t −d e f a u l t . bro " ; e x i t
f i
echo "Ok"
s l eep 1
echo " Compiling Binpac sources to C++.."
cd $BRO_PATH$ANALYZER_PATH
Binpac −I $BRO_PATH$SRC opcua . pac
echo "Ok"
#patch to p r i n t par se r except ions ( to catch de tec t malformed packets )
cd $BRO_PATH
patch −p1 < pr in t_excep t i on . patch
#f o r s a f e t y
mkdir −p $BRO_PATH/ bu i ld / s r c / ana lyzer / pro toco l /
cp −r $BRO_PATH/ s r c / ana lyzer / pro toco l /* $BRO_PATH/ bu i ld / s r c / ana lyzer / pro toco l /
echo " Recompiling bro to inc lude the updated ana lyzer . . "
s l eep 2
cd $BRO_PATH
make
echo " Updating OPC UA bro s c r i p t s , t h i s w i l l need super user ’ s powers . . "
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#d e f a u l t p o l i c y s c r i p t s
sudo mkdir −p $BRO_INSTALLATION_PATH/ share / bro / s i t e / base / p ro to co l s /opcua/
sudo cp −r $BRO_PATH/ s c r i p t s / base / p ro to co l s /opcua/* $BRO_INSTALLATION_PATH/
share / bro / s i t e / base / p ro to co l s /opcua/
#def ine OPC UA types s t r u c t u r e s
sudo cp $BRO_PATH/ s c r i p t s / base / i n i t −bare . bro $BRO_INSTALLATION_PATH/ share / bro /
base / i n i t −bare . bro
#f i x #2
sudo mkdir −p / usr / l o c a l / share / bro / base /
sudo cp $BRO_PATH/ s c r i p t s / base / i n i t −bare . bro / usr / l o c a l / share / bro / base / i n i t −
bare . bro
#update other s c r i p t s
sudo cp $BRO_PATH/ bu i ld / s c r i p t s / base / b i f / p lug ins /* $BRO_INSTALLATION_PATH/ share
/ bro / base / b i f / p lug ins
echo " Done . "
B Invalid sequence number detection script
In this appendix section is listed the code of the Bro policy script that detects wrong sequence numbers, mismatching
request response pairs and requests without a response.
module OPCUA;
type reques t s _ t ype s : enum { _SECURE_CHANNEL_REQUEST , _PUBLISH_REQUEST , _BROWSE_REQUEST,
_READ_REQUEST , _WRITE_REQUEST , _CREATE_SUBSCR_REQUEST , _GET_ENDPOINTS_REQUEST ,
_CREATE_MONITORED_ITEMS_REQUEST , _CREATE_SESSION_REQUEST , _ACTIVATE_SESSION_REQUEST
, _TRANSLATE_BROWSE_PATH_TO_NODE_IDS_REQUEST , _UNDEFINED_REQ};
type responses_ types : enum { _SECURE_CHANNEL_RESPONSE , _PUBLISH_RESPONSE ,
_BROWSE_RESPONSE, _READ_RESPONSE , _WRITE_RESPONSE , _CREATE_SUBSCR_RESPONSE ,
_GET_ENDPOINTS_RESPONSE , _CREATE_MONITORED_ITEMS_RESPONSE , _CREATE_SESSION_RESPONSE
, _ACTIVATE_SESSION_RESPONSE , _TRANSLATE_BROWSE_PATH_TO_NODE_IDS_RESPONSE ,
_UNDEFINED_RES} ;
#keeps max sequence number rece ived per each connect ion
g loba l max_sequence_number : t a b l e [ conn_id ] of count ;
#fo r each reques t_ id , keeps t r a ck i f reques t has been rece ived (F) or req and resp (T)
g loba l request_numbers : t a b l e [ conn_id ] of t a b l e [ count ] of bool ;
#t r a c k s reques t s types
g loba l r eques t s : t a b l e [ conn_id ] of t a b l e [ count ] of r eques t s _ t ype s ;
#t r a c k s responses types
g loba l responses : t a b l e [ conn_id ] of t a b l e [ count ] of responses_ types ;
func t ion ge t_ reques t_ type ( req : count ) : r eques t s _ t ype s {
l o c a l va l : r eques t s _ t ype s=_UNDEFINED_REQ;
i f ( req==0xbe01 )
va l=_SECURE_CHANNEL_REQUEST;
e l s e i f ( req==0x3a03 )
va l=_PUBLISH_REQUEST ;
e l s e i f ( req==0x0f02 )
va l=_BROWSE_REQUEST;
e l s e i f ( req==0x7702)
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va l=_READ_REQUEST;
e l s e i f ( req==0xa102 )
va l=_WRITE_REQUEST ;
e l s e i f ( req==0x1303)
va l=_CREATE_SUBSCR_REQUEST ;
e l s e i f ( req==0xac01 )
va l=_GET_ENDPOINTS_REQUEST ;
e l s e i f ( req==0xef02 )
va l=_CREATE_MONITORED_ITEMS_REQUEST;
e l s e i f ( req==0xcd01 )
va l=_CREATE_SESSION_REQUEST ;
e l s e i f ( req==0xd301)
va l=_ACTIVATE_SESSION_REQUEST ;
e l s e i f ( req==0x2a02 )
va l=_TRANSLATE_BROWSE_PATH_TO_NODE_IDS_REQUEST;
re turn va l ;
}
func t ion get_response_type ( req : count ) : responses_ types {
l o c a l va l : re sponses_ types=_UNDEFINED_RES ;
i f ( req==0xc101 )
va l=_SECURE_CHANNEL_RESPONSE;
e l s e i f ( req==0x3d03)
va l=_PUBLISH_RESPONSE ;
e l s e i f ( req==0x1202)
va l=_BROWSE_RESPONSE;
e l s e i f ( req==0x7a02 )
va l=_READ_RESPONSE;
e l s e i f ( req==0xa402 )
va l=_WRITE_RESPONSE ;
e l s e i f ( req==0x1603)
va l=_CREATE_SUBSCR_RESPONSE ;
e l s e i f ( req==0xaf01 )
va l=_GET_ENDPOINTS_RESPONSE ;
e l s e i f ( req==0xf202 )
va l=_CREATE_MONITORED_ITEMS_RESPONSE;
e l s e i f ( req==0xd001)
va l=_CREATE_SESSION_RESPONSE ;
e l s e i f ( req==0xd601)
va l=_ACTIVATE_SESSION_RESPONSE ;
e l s e i f ( req==0x2d02)
va l=_TRANSLATE_BROWSE_PATH_TO_NODE_IDS_RESPONSE;
re turn va l ;
}
# HEL message r e s e t s s t a t e of sequence numbers
event opcua_hel lo_event ( c : connection , params : connect ion_parameters , end_point_ur l :
s t r i n g ) {
de l e t e max_sequence_number [ c$id ] ;
de l e t e request_numbers [ c$id ] ;
}
event bro_done () {
p r i n t " Terminating Bro s c r i p t , checking i f each reques t had a response . . " ;
f o r (k in request_numbers ) {
f o r ( kk in request_numbers [k ])
i f ( request_numbers [k ][ kk]==F)
p r i n t fmt ( " Request %d had no response " , kk ) ;
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}
}
# check each MSG message to v e r i f y v a l i d i t y of sequence_numbers
event opcua_message_event ( c : connection , params : OPCUA : : secur i ty_params , type_ id : count
) {
#i f f i r s t message f o r t h i s connection , i n i t record in t a b l e
i f ( c$id ! in request_numbers )
request_numbers [ c$id]=t a b l e () ;
# i f t r e q u e s t _ i d has never been rece ived f o r t h i s connection , t h i s i s a reques t
i f ( [ params$secur i ty_reques t_ id ] ! in request_numbers [ c$id ] ) {
request_numbers [ c$id ][ params$secur i t y_reques t_ id ] = F ;
l o c a l _ t : r eques t s _ t ype s=get_ reques t_ type ( type_ id ) ;
i f ( _ t !=_UNDEFINED_REQ) {
i f ( c$id ! in reques t s )
r eques t s [ c$id]=t a b l e () ;
r eques t s [ c$id ][ params$secur i ty_reques t_ id ] = _t ;
}
e l s e {
l o c a l _ t t : re sponses_ types=get_response_type ( type_ id ) ;
i f ( c$id ! in responses )
responses [ c$id]=t a b l e () ;
responses [ c$id ][ params$secur i ty_reques t_ id ] = _ t t ;
p r i n t fmt ( " Weird , a reques t was expected but i s a response %s " ,
_ t t ) ;
}
#i f the reques t has no v a l i d sequence_number , e r ro r
i f ( c$id in max_sequence_number && params$security_sequence_number !=
max_sequence_number [ c$id]+1 ) {
p r i n t fmt ( " i n v a l i d sequence_number : reques t : %s , response:%s ,
[%d ] , reques t id [%d] detec ted on %s " , (
params$secur i ty_reques t_ id in reques t s [ c$id ]) ? reques t s [
c$id ][ params$secur i ty_reques t_ id ] : _UNDEFINED_REQ , (
params$secur i ty_reques t_ id in responses [ c$id ]) ? responses [
c$id ][ params$secur i ty_reques t_ id ] : _UNDEFINED_RES ,
params$security_sequence_number , params$secur i ty_reques t_ id
, c$id ) ;
}
#otherwise , update the max_sequence_number f o r t h i s connect ion
e l s e i f ( ( ! ( c$id in max_sequence_number ) ) ||
params$security_sequence_number > max_sequence_number [ c$id ] )
max_sequence_number [ c$id ] = params$security_sequence_number ;
#p r i n t fmt("%d %d max: %d " , params$secur i ty_reques t_ id ,
params$security_sequence_number , max_sequence_number [ c$id ]) ;
}
#otherwise , check i f a response has been a l ready rece ived , i f yes throw er ro r
e l s e i f ( request_numbers [ c$id ][ params$secur i t y_ reques t_ id ] == T )
p r i n t fmt ( " i n v a l i d sequence_number : reques t : %s , response:%s , [%d ] ,
reques t id [%d] detec ted on %s " , ( params$secur i t y_ reques t_ id in
reques t s [ c$id ]) ? reques t s [ c$id ][ params$secur i ty_reques t_ id ] :
_UNDEFINED_REQ , ( params$secur i ty_reques t_ id in responses [ c$id ]) ?
responses [ c$id ][ params$secur i ty_reques t_ id ] : _UNDEFINED_RES ,
params$security_sequence_number , params$secur i ty_reques t_ id , c$id ) ;
#otherwise , t h i s i s a [ p o t e n t i a l l y ] v a l i d response
e l s e {
#p r i n t fmt("%d %d max: %d " , params$secur i ty_reques t_ id ,
params$security_sequence_number , max_sequence_number [ c$id ]) ;
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request_numbers [ c$id ][ params$secur i t y_reques t_ id ] = T ;
#update t r a ck ing of reques t / response p a i r s
l o c a l t : re sponses_ types=get_response_type ( type_ id ) ;
i f ( t !=_UNDEFINED_RES) {
i f ( c$id ! in responses )
responses [ c$id]=t a b l e () ;
responses [ c$id ][ params$secur i ty_reques t_ id ] = t ;
}
e l s e {
l o c a l t t : r eques t s _ t ype s=get_ reques t_ type ( type_ id ) ;
i f ( c$id ! in reques t s )
r eques t s [ c$id]=t a b l e () ;
r eques t s [ c$id ][ params$secur i ty_reques t_ id ] = t t ;
p r i n t fmt ( " Weird , a reques t was expected but i s a response %s " ,
t t ) ;
}
#responses should br ing a sequence_number tha t i s smal l e r than the
maximum sequence_number t ransmi t t ed
i f ( c$id in max_sequence_number && params$security_sequence_number >
max_sequence_number [ c$id ] ) {
p r i n t fmt ( " i n v a l i d sequence_number : reques t : %s , response:%s ,
[%d ] , reques t id [%d] detec ted on %s " , (
params$secur i ty_reques t_ id in reques t s [ c$id ]) ? reques t s [
c$id ][ params$secur i ty_reques t_ id ] : _UNDEFINED_REQ , (
params$secur i ty_reques t_ id in responses [ c$id ]) ? responses [
c$id ][ params$secur i ty_reques t_ id ] : _UNDEFINED_RES ,
params$security_sequence_number , params$secur i ty_reques t_ id
, c$id ) ;
}
}
}
C Bro OPC UA data structures
This section lists the code that define the data structures that the parser generated by Binpac will fill and pass to the Bro
policy processor for further analysis.
The following code comes from the “$BRO_PATH/scripts/base/init-bare.bro”.
# OPC UA s t r u c t u r e s d e f i n i t i o n s
# Writ ten by Tomas B o r t o l i
module OPCUA;
export {
type OPCUA : : connect ion_parameters : record {
ver s ion : counter ;
r e c e i v e _ b u f f e r _ s i z e : counter ;
s end_bu f f e r_ s i z e : counter ;
max_msg_size : counter ;
max_chunk_count : counter ;
} ;
type OPCUA : : node_id : record {
encoding_mask : counter ;
token : any ; #might be : counter , numeric
} ;
type OPCUA : : request_header : record {
authen t i ca t ion_ token : OPCUA : : node_id ;
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timestamp : time ;
request_handle : counter ;
r e t u r n _ d i a g n o s t i c s : counter ;
aud i t _en t r y_ id : counter ;
t imeout_h int : counter ;
add i t iona l_header : counter ;
} ;
type OPCUA : : response_header : record {
timestamp : time ;
request_handle : counter ;
s e r v i c e _ r e s u l t : counter ;
s e r v i c e _ d i a g n o s t i c _ f l a g : counter ;
s t r i n g _ t a b l e : counter ;
add i t iona l_header : counter ;
} ;
type OPCUA : : view : record {
node_id : counter ;
timestamp : time ;
v iew_vers ion : counter ;
} ;
type OPCUA : : browse_descr ip t ion : record {
node_id : node_id ;
browse_d i rec t ion : counter ;
r e f e r ence_ type_ id : node_id ;
inc lude_subtype : counter ;
node_class_mask : counter ;
resul t_mask : counter ;
} ;
type OPCUA : : b rowse_desc r ip t ion_vec to r : vec to r of OPCUA : : browse_descr ip t ion ;
type OPCUA : : qual i f ied_name : record {
id : counter ;
name : s t r i n g ;
} ;
type OPCUA : : l o c a l i z e d _ t e x t : record {
encoding_mask : counter ;
l o c a l e : s t r i n g ;
t e x t : s t r i n g ;
} ;
type OPCUA : : r e f e rence : record {
re f e rence_ type_ id : node_id ;
i s_ forward : bool ;
node_id : counter ;
browse_name : OPCUA : : qual i f ied_name ;
display_name : OPCUA : : l o c a l i z e d _ t e x t ;
node_c lass : counter ;
t y p e _ d e f i n i t i o n : counter ;
} ;
type OPCUA : : r e f e r ence_vec to r : vec to r of OPCUA : : r e f e rence ;
type OPCUA : : browse_resu l t : record {
s ta tus_code : counter ;
con t inua t ion_po in t : counter ;
r e f e r en c e s : OPCUA : : r e f e r ence_vec to r ;
} ;
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type OPCUA : : b rowse_re su l t _vec to r : vec to r of OPCUA : : browse_resu l t ;
type OPCUA : : s e cu r i t y_ token : record {
channel_ id : counter ;
token_id : counter ;
c rea ted_a t : time ;
r e v i s e d _ l i f e t i m e : counter ;
} ;
type OPCUA : : n o t i f i c a t i o n : record {
seuqence_number : counter ;
timestamp : time ;
n o t i f i c a t i o n _ d a t a : counter &op t iona l ;
} ;
type OPCUA : : data_value : record {
encoding_mask : counter ;
va r i an t_ t ype : counter ;
value : any ; #might be : numeric , counter , node_id , qual i f ied_name ,
a r r a y _ o f _ s t r i n g
s ta tus_code : counter ;
} ;
type OPCUA : : read : record {
node_id : OPCUA : : node_id ;
a t t r i b u t e _ i d : counter ;
index_range : counter ;
data_encoding : OPCUA : : qual i f ied_name ;
} ;
type OPCUA : : da ta_va lue_vec tor : vec to r of OPCUA : : data_value ;
type OPCUA : : read_vec tor : vec to r of OPCUA : : read ;
type OPCUA : : s t r i n g _ v e c t o r : vec to r of s t r i n g ;
type OPCUA : : numeric : record {
namespace_index : counter ;
i den t i f i ed_numer i c : counter ;
} ;
type OPCUA : : secur i ty_params : record {
secure_channel_ id : counter ;
s e cu r i t y _ tok en _ id : counter ;
securi ty_sequence_number : counter ;
s e c u r i t y _ r e q u e s t _ i d : counter ;
} ;
type OPCUA : : a p p l i c a t i o n _ d e s c r i p t i o n : record {
a p p l i c a t i o n _ u r i : s t r i n g ;
product_ur i : s t r i n g ;
appl icat ion_name : OPCUA : : l o c a l i z e d _ t e x t ;
a p p l i c a t i o n _ t y p e : count ;
gateway_server_ur i : s t r i n g ;
d i s c o v e r y _ p r o f i l e _ u r i : s t r i n g ;
d i s c o v e r y _ u r l : OPCUA : : s t r i n g _ v e c t o r ;
} ;
type OPCUA : : use r_ token_po l i cy : record {
p o l i c y _ i d : s t r i n g ;
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user_token_type : count ;
i s sued_token_type : s t r i n g ;
i s sue r_endpo in t _u r l : s t r i n g ;
s e c u r i t y _ p o l i c y _ u r i : s t r i n g ;
} ;
type OPCUA : : u se r_ token_po l i cy_vec to r : vec to r of OPCUA : : use r_ token_po l i cy ;
type OPCUA : : endpo in t_desc r ip t i on : record {
endpoint_ur l : s t r i n g ;
s e r ve r : OPCUA : : a p p l i c a t i o n _ d e s c r i p t i o n ;
s e r v e r _ c e r t i f i c a t e : s t r i n g ;
message_security_mode : count ;
s e c u r i t y _ p o l i c y _ u r i : s t r i n g ;
u s e r _ i d e n t i t y _ t o k e n s : OPCUA : : u se r_ token_po l i c y_vec to r ;
t r a n s p o r t _ p r o f i l e _ u r i : s t r i n g ;
s e c u r i t y _ l e v e l : count ;
} ;
type OPCUA : : endpo in t_des c r i p t i on_vec to r : vec to r of OPCUA : : endpo in t_desc r ip t i on ;
}
D Bro OPC UA Application Programming Interface
This appendix contains the API definition that the OPC UA plug-in, contribute of the project, provides to Bro policy scripts
for analyzing OPC UA traffic. Please refer to appendix C for details on the custom types used in the API.
The following code comes from “$BRO_PATH/src/analysis/protocol/opcua/events.bif” and defines the interface between
parser and policy scripts.
# Writ ten by Tomas B o r t o l i <tomasbortol i@gmail . com>
#
# This f i l e de f ine s the events tha t the a n a l y s i s generates
## c : The connect ion
##
event opcua_event%(c : connection , chunk_type : count , message_size : count%);
## OPC UA Hel lo event
event opcua_hel lo_event%(c : connection , params : OPCUA : : connect ion_parameters ,
end_point_ur l : s t r i n g%);
## ACK event
event opcua_ack_event%(c : connection , params : OPCUA : : connect ion_parameters%);
## Open/ c l o s e events
event opcua_open_event%(c : connection , secure_channel_ id : count ,
s e c u r i t y _ p o l i c y _ u r i : s t r i ng , s e n d e r _ c e r t i f i c a t e : count ,
r e c e i v e r _ c e r t i f i c a t e _ t h u m b p r i n t : count , sequence_number : count , r eques t_ id :
count%);
event opcua_c lose_event%(c : connect ion%);
event opcua_message_event%(c : connection , params : OPCUA : : secur i ty_params ,
type_ id : count%);
## Open secure channel events
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event opcua_open_secure_channel_request_event%(c : connection , header : OPCUA : :
request_header , c l i e n t _ p r o t o c o l _ v e r s i o n : count , s e cu r i t y_ token_ reques t _ t ype
: count , message_security_mode : count , c l i en t_nonce : s t r i n g%);
event opcua_open_secure_channel_response_event%(c : connection , header : OPCUA : :
response_header , s e r v e r _ p r o t o c o l _ v e r s i o n : count , s e cu r i t y_ token : OPCUA : :
secur i t y_ token , server_nonce : s t r i n g%);
## Browse events
event opcua_browse_request%(c : connection , header : OPCUA : : request_header , view_
: OPCUA : : view , nodes : OPCUA : : browse_descr ip t ion_vec tor ,
request_max_references_per_node : count%);
event opcua_browse_response%(c : connection , header : OPCUA : : response_header ,
nodes : OPCUA : : browse_resu l t_vec tor , d i a g n o s t i c s _ i n f o : count%);
# Read events
event opcua_read_request%(c : connection , header : OPCUA : : request_header , max_age
: count , t imestamp_to_return : count , nodes_to_read : OPCUA : : read_vec tor %);
event opcua_read_response%(c : connect ion , header : OPCUA : : response_header ,
r e s u l t s : OPCUA : : da ta_va lue_vec tor%);
# Write events
event opcua_wri te_request%(c : connect ion%);
event opcua_write_response%(c : connect ion %);
## Publ i sh events
event opcua_publ i sh_request%(c : connection , header : OPCUA : : request_header %);
event opcua_publ i sh_response%(c : connection , header : OPCUA : : response_header ,
s u b s c r i p t i o n _ i d : count , mo re_ no t i f i c a t i o n s : bool , n o t i f i c a t i o n : OPCUA : :
n o t i f i c a t i o n %);
# Subsc r ip t i on events
event opcua_crea te_subsc r_reques t%(c : connection , header : OPCUA : : request_header
, p u b l i s h i n g _ i n t e r v a l : count , l i f e t i m e _ c o u n t : count , max_keep_alive_count :
count , max_no t i f i c a t i ons_pe r_pub l i sh : count , pub l i sh ing_enab le : bool ,
p r i o r i t y : count%);
event opcua_create_subscr_response%(c : connection , header : OPCUA : :
response_header , s u b s c r i p t i o n _ i d : count , r e v i s e d _ p u b l i s h i n g _ i n t e r v a l : count
, r e v i s e d _ l i f e t i m e _ c o u n t : count , rev ised_max_keep_al ive_count : count%);
# Get endpoints events
event opcua_get_endpoints_request%(c : connection , header : OPCUA : : request_header
, endpoint_ur l : s t r i ng , l o c a l e _ i d s : OPCUA : : s t r i n g _ v e c t o r , p r o f i l e _ u r i s :
OPCUA : : s t r i n g _ v e c t o r%);
event opcua_get_endpoints_response%(c : connection , header : OPCUA : :
response_header , endpoints : OPCUA : : endpo in t_des c r i p t i on_vec to r%);
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E Bro test script
This appendix section lists the code that the author developed to provide a simple policy script to test Bro functionalities,
to evaluate performances and to perform logging operations.
# Writ ten by Tomas B o r t o l i <tomasbortol i@gmail . com>
#
module OPCUA;
event b r o _ i n i t ( ) {
p r i n t "OPC UA p o l i c y s c r i p t i n i t " ;
p r i n t " " ;
}
event opcua_event ( c : connection , chunk_type : count , message_size : count )
{
p r i n t " " ;
p r i n t fmt ( " got OPC UA PDU − chunk_type : %d , message_size : %d " , chunk_type ,
message_size ) ;
}
event opcua_hel lo_event ( c : connection , params : connect ion_parameters , end_point_ur l :
s t r i n g ) {
p r i n t fmt ( " got OPC UA hel lo , ve r s ion : %d , r e c e i v e _ b u f f e r _ s i z e : %d ,
send_bu f f e r_ s i z e : %d , max_msg_size : %d , max_chunk_count : %d , end_point_ur l :
%s " , params$version , params$rece ive_buf fe r_s i ze , params$send_buffer_s ize ,
params$max_msg_size , params$max_chunk_count , end_point_ur l ) ;
}
event opcua_ack_event ( c : connection , params : connect ion_parameters ) {
p r i n t fmt ( " got OPC UA ack , ve r s ion : %d , r e c e i v e _ b u f f e r _ s i z e : %d ,
send_bu f f e r_ s i z e : %d , max_msg_size : %d , max_chunk_count : %d " ,
params$version , params$rece ive_buf fe r_s i ze , params$send_buffer_s ize ,
params$max_msg_size , params$max_chunk_count ) ;
}
event opcua_open_event ( c : connection , secure_channel_ id : count , s e c u r i t y _ p o l i c y _ u r i :
s t r i ng , s e n d e r _ c e r t i f i c a t e : count , r e c e i v e r _ c e r t i f i c a t e _ t h u m b p r i n t : count ,
sequence_number : count , r eques t_ id : count ) {
p r i n t fmt ( " got OPC UA open , secure_channel_ id : %d , s e c u r i t y _ p o l i c y _ u r i : %s ,
s e n d e r _ c e r t i f i c a t e : %d , r e c e i v e r _ c e r t i f i c a t e _ t h u m b p r i n t : %d ,
sequence_number : %d , reques t_ id : %d " , secure_channel_ id , s e c u r i t y _ p o l i c y _ u r i
, s e n d e r _ c e r t i f i c a t e , r e c e i v e r _ c e r t i f i c a t e _ t h u m b p r i n t , sequence_number ,
r eques t_ id ) ;
}
event opcua_c lose_event ( c : connect ion ) {
p r i n t " got an OPC UA Close " ;
}
event opcua_message_event ( c : connection , params : OPCUA : : secur i ty_params , type_ id : count
) {
p r i n t fmt ( " Got OPC UA MESSAGE − type_ id : %x , secure_channel_ id : %d ,
s e cu r i t y _ tok en _ id : %d , securi ty_sequence_number : %d , s e c u r i t y _ r e q u e s t _ i d : %
d " , type_id , params$secure_channel_id , params$secur i ty_token_id ,
params$security_sequence_number , params$secur i t y_ reques t_ id ) ;
}
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event opcua_open_secure_channel_request_event ( c : connection , header : request_header ,
c l i e n t _ p r o t o c o l _ v e r s i o n : count , s e cu r i t y_ token_ reques t _ t ype : count ,
message_security_mode : count , c l i en t_nonce : s t r i n g ) {
p r i n t fmt ( " open secure channel request , c l i e n t _ p r o t o c o l _ v e r s i o n : %d ,
secu r i t y_ token_ reques t _ t ype : %d , message_security_mode : %d , c l i en t_nonce : %
s −−−−− %s " , c l i e n t _ p r o t o c o l _ v e r s i o n , secur i t y_ token_reques t_ type ,
message_security_mode , c l ient_nonce , s t r f t i m e ("%D %R" , header$timestamp ) ) ;
}
event opcua_open_secure_channel_response_event ( c : connection , header : response_header ,
s e r v e r _ p r o t o c o l _ v e r s i o n : count , s t : s ecur i t y_ token , server_nonce : s t r i n g ) {
p r i n t fmt ( " secure channel open response − server_nonce : %s − timestamp : %s " ,
server_nonce , s t r f t i m e ("%D %R" , header$timestamp ) ) ;
}
event opcua_browse_request ( c : connection , header : request_header , view : view , nodes :
browse_descr ip t ion_vec tor , request_max_references_per_node : count ) {
p r i n t fmt ( " browse reques t of %d elements − request_max_references_per_node : %d
" , |nodes | , request_max_references_per_node ) ;
l o c a l i =0;
while ( i <|nodes |) {
p r i n t fmt ( " node_id : %d , re f e rence_ type_ id : %d , inc lude_subtype : %d ,
node_class_mask : %d , resul t_mask : %d " , nodes [ i ]
$node_id$encoding_mask , nodes [ i ] $reference_type_id$encoding_mask ,
nodes [ i ] $include_subtype , nodes [ i ] $node_class_mask , nodes [ i ]
$resul t_mask ) ;
i+=1;
}
}
event opcua_browse_response ( c : connection , header : response_header , r e s u l t s :
b rowse_resu l t_vec tor , d i a g n o s t i c s _ i n f o : count ) {
p r i n t fmt ( " browse response of %d elements " , | r e s u l t s |) ;
l o c a l i =0;
while ( i <|r e s u l t s |) {
p r i n t fmt ( " s ta tus_code : %d , con t inua t ion_po in t : %d , r e f e r e n ce s : %d " ,
r e s u l t s [ i ] $status_code , r e s u l t s [ i ] $cont inuat ion_point , | r e s u l t s [ i ]
$ re fe rences |) ;
l o c a l j =0;
while ( j <|r e s u l t s [ i ] $ re fe rences |) {
p r i n t fmt ( " r e f e r ence_ type_ id : %d , i s_ forward %d " , r e s u l t s [ i ]
$ re fe rences [ j ] $reference_type_id$encoding_mask , r e s u l t s [ i ]
$ re fe rences [ j ] $ i s_ forward ) ;
j+=1;
}
i+=1;
}
}
event opcua_read_request ( c : connection , header : request_header , max_age : count ,
t imestamp_to_return : count , nodes_to_read : OPCUA : : read_vec tor ) {
p r i n t fmt ( " read reques t of %d elements , max_age : %d , t imestamp_to_return : %d " ,
| nodes_to_read | , max_age , t imestamp_to_return ) ;
}
event opcua_read_response ( c : connection , header : response_header , r e s u l t s :
da ta_va lue_vec tor ) {
p r i n t fmt ( " read response of %d elements " , | r e s u l t s |) ;
l o c a l i =0;
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while ( i <|r e s u l t s |) {
p r i n t fmt ( " encoding_mask : %d , va r i an t_ t ype : %d " , r e s u l t s [ i ]
$encoding_mask , r e s u l t s [ i ] $var ian t_ type ) ;
i+=1;
}
}
event opcua_wri te_request ( c : connect ion ) {
p r i n t " wr i te reques t " ;
}
event opcua_write_response ( c : connect ion ) {
p r i n t " wr i te response " ;
}
event opcua_publ i sh_request ( c : connection , header : request_header ) {
p r i n t " pub l i sh reques t " ;
}
event opcua_publ i sh_response ( c : connection , header : response_header , s u b s c r i p t i o n _ i d :
count , mo re_ no t i f i c a t i o n s : bool , n o t i f i c a t i o n _ : n o t i f i c a t i o n ) {
p r i n t fmt ( " pub l i sh response − s u b s c r i p t i o n _ i d : %d " , s u b s c r i p t i o n _ i d ) ;
}
event opcua_crea te_subsc r_reques t ( c : connection , header : OPCUA : : request_header ,
p u b l i s h i n g _ i n t e r v a l : count , l i f e t i m e _ c o u n t : count , max_keep_alive_count : count ,
max_no t i f i c a t i ons_pe r_pub l i sh : count , pub l i sh ing_enab le : bool , p r i o r i t y : count ) {
p r i n t " s u b s c r i p t i o n reques t " ;
}
event opcua_create_subscr_response ( c : connection , header : OPCUA : : response_header ,
s u b s c r i p t i o n _ i d : count , r e v i s e d _ p u b l i s h i n g _ i n t e r v a l : count , r e v i s e d _ l i f e t i m e _ c o u n t :
count , rev ised_max_keep_al ive_count : count ) {
p r i n t fmt ( " s u b s c r i p t i o n response , r e v i s e d _ l i f e t i m e _ c o u n t : %d " ,
r e v i s e d _ l i f e t i m e _ c o u n t ) ;
}
event opcua_get_endpoints_request ( c : connection , header : OPCUA : : request_header ,
endpoint_ur l : s t r i ng , l o c a l e _ i d s : OPCUA : : s t r i n g _ v e c t o r , p r o f i l e _ u r i s : OPCUA : :
s t r i n g _ v e c t o r ) {
p r i n t fmt ( " got endpoints reques t − endpoint_ur l : %s " , endpoint_ur l ) ;
l o c a l i =0;
while ( i <|l o c a l e _ i d s |) {
p r i n t fmt ("[%d] = %s " , i , l o c a l e _ i d s [ i ] ) ;
i+=1;
}
}
event opcua_get_endpoints_response ( c : connection , header : OPCUA : : response_header ,
endpoints : OPCUA : : endpo in t_des c r i p t i on_vec to r ) {
p r i n t " got endpoints response " ;
}
F Fuzzing script
This section is dedicated to the script that the author wrote to generate and send mutated OPC UA packets to an OPC
UA server, with the purpose of generating malformed packets to test the robustness of the Binpac’s parser. The program
listed in this section does not have to be considered a finalized working program but a Python script written from scratch,
that has been further modified to count the OPC UA effective data in PCAP files and to fuzz similarly to as it is done here.
from scapy . a l l import *
import copy
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import socke t
from random import *
from datet ime import datet ime
from time import *
seed ( datet ime . now() )
g loba l s , s_ ip , counter
# a − array to seek in
# b − array to f ind
def f indSubArray (a , b) :
i = 0
j = 0
found = Fa l se
i f len (a )<len (b) :
re turn −1
while i<len (a ) :
while i+j<len (a ) and j<len (b) and a[ i+j]==b[ j ] :
j+=1
i f len (b)==j :
found=True
break
i+=1
i f not found :
re turn −1
e l s e :
re turn i
def mutateRandByte ( array ) :
g loba l counter
f o r i in range (2) :
ar ray [ rand in t (0 , len ( array )−1)]=rand in t (0 ,255)
p r i n t " mutated "
p r i n t ar ray
re turn array
def e s t a b l i s h () :
g loba l s
s = socket . socke t ( socke t . AF_INET , socke t .SOCK_STREAM)
s . connect ( ( "127 .0 .0 .1 " ,4840) )
def sendTest ( payload ) :
g loba l s
p = Raw( load=payload )
s . send ( bytes (p) )
counter = 0
s_ ip = ’ ’
e s t a b l i s h ()
pkts = PcapReader ( ’ . / t b o r t o l i /PCAPs/mypcaps/ t e s t . pcapng ’ )
f o r p in pkts :
counter+=1
p r i n t counter
p r i n t p [ ’ IP ’ ] . s r c
# f i r s t packet i s assumed to have the IP of the host we emulate
i f s _ ip == ’ ’:
s _ ip=p [ ’ IP ’ ] . s r c
i f s _ ip !=p [ ’ IP ’ ] . s r c :
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cont inue
b = bytear ray ()
b . extend ( s t r (p) )
p r i n t " o r i g i n a l "
p r i n t b
c = bytear ray ()
c . extend ( s t r (p [ ’ TCP ’ ] ) )
p r i n t " tcp "
p r i n t c
p r i n t " app "
pp = copy . deepcopy (p) # deep ( r e c u r s i v e ) copy
pp [ ’ TCP ’ ] . remove\ _payload ()
p r i n t b[ f indSubArray (b , c )+len (pp [ ’ TCP ’ ] ) : ]
#i f conta ins PAYLOAD upon the TCP header , mutate and send
i f len (b[ f indSubArray (b , c )+len (pp [ ’ TCP ’ ] ) : ] ) >0:
sendTest (b[ f indSubArray (b , c )+len (pp [ ’ TCP ’ ] ) : ] )
G Valgrind log
This appendix section has been allocated to be a direct reference to the Valgrind log of the execution of Bro that brought
to the crash of the plug-in discovered and fixed during the robustness tests, section 3.3.2 [39]. This crash log helped
the author in identifying the problem that arose because of an out-of-bound exception that Binpac was missing (Binpac’s
bug). Later reported and fixed by the author [1].
==14061== Memcheck , a memory e r ro r de t e c to r
==14061== Copyright (C) 2002−2017, and GNU GPL ’ d , by Ju l i an Seward et a l .
==14061== Using Valgr ind −3.13.0 and LibVEX ; rerun with −h fo r copyr igh t i n fo
==14061== Command: /home/ b o r t o l i / t b o r t o l i /sw/bro−2.5/ bu i ld / s r c / bro −Cr /home/ b o r t o l i /
t b o r t o l i /PCAPs/mypcaps/malformed−2.pcapng
==14061==
==14061== Condi t iona l jump or move depends on u n i n i t i a l i s e d value ( s )
==14061== at 0xBC2204 : binpac : : OPCUA : : read_vec tor ( binpac : : OPCUA : : ARRAY_OF_READ*) (
opcua_pac . cc :5209)
==14061== by 0xBBEFA0 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_Flow : : proc_opcua_read_request ( binpac : :
OPCUA : : OPCUA_READ_REQUEST*) ( opcua_pac . cc :4867)
==14061== by 0xBB879B : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_READ_REQUEST : : Parse ( unsigned char const
* , unsigned char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :2660)
==14061== by 0xBBC6FC : binpac : : OPCUA : : MESSAGE : : Parse ( unsigned char const * , unsigned
char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :4034)
==14061== by 0xBBD138 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_MESSAGE : : Parse ( unsigned char const * ,
unsigned char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :4287)
==14061== by 0xBBD9C7 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_PDU : : Par seBu f f e r ( binpac : : FlowBuffer * ,
binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA*) ( opcua_pac . cc :4494)
==14061== by 0xBBE5C4 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_Flow : : NewData( unsigned char const * ,
unsigned char const *) ( opcua_pac . cc :4726)
==14061== by 0xBB1FB7 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_Conn : : NewData( bool , unsigned char const
* , unsigned char const *) ( opcua_pac . cc :48)
==14061== by 0xBAFBDC: ana lyzer : : opcua : : OPCUA_Analyzer : : Del iverStream ( in t , unsigned
char const * , bool ) (OPCUA. cc :60)
==14061== by 0xD4D0D8: ana lyzer : : Analyzer : : NextStream ( int , unsigned char const * ,
bool ) ( Analyzer . cc :245)
==14061== by 0xD4D542 : ana lyzer : : Analyzer : : ForwardStream ( int , unsigned char const * ,
bool ) ( Analyzer . cc :331)
==14061== by 0xCA0237 : ana lyzer : : tcp : : TCP_Reassembler : : De l i v e r ( unsigned long , in t ,
unsigned char const *) ( TCP_Reassembler . cc :455)
==14061==
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==14061== I n v a l i d read of s i z e 8
==14061== at 0xBC21F9 : binpac : : OPCUA : : read_vec tor ( binpac : : OPCUA : : ARRAY_OF_READ*) (
opcua_pac . cc :5209)
==14061== by 0xBBEFA0 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_Flow : : proc_opcua_read_request ( binpac : :
OPCUA : : OPCUA_READ_REQUEST*) ( opcua_pac . cc :4867)
==14061== by 0xBB879B : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_READ_REQUEST : : Parse ( unsigned char const
* , unsigned char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :2660)
==14061== by 0xBBC6FC : binpac : : OPCUA : : MESSAGE : : Parse ( unsigned char const * , unsigned
char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :4034)
==14061== by 0xBBD138 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_MESSAGE : : Parse ( unsigned char const * ,
unsigned char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :4287)
==14061== by 0xBBD9C7 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_PDU : : Par seBu f f e r ( binpac : : FlowBuffer * ,
binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA*) ( opcua_pac . cc :4494)
==14061== by 0xBBE5C4 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_Flow : : NewData( unsigned char const * ,
unsigned char const *) ( opcua_pac . cc :4726)
==14061== by 0xBB1FB7 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_Conn : : NewData( bool , unsigned char const
* , unsigned char const *) ( opcua_pac . cc :48)
==14061== by 0xBAFBDC: ana lyzer : : opcua : : OPCUA_Analyzer : : Del iverStream ( int , unsigned
char const * , bool ) (OPCUA. cc :60)
==14061== by 0xD4D0D8: ana lyzer : : Analyzer : : NextStream ( int , unsigned char const * ,
bool ) ( Analyzer . cc :245)
==14061== by 0xD4D542 : ana lyzer : : Analyzer : : ForwardStream ( int , unsigned char const * ,
bool ) ( Analyzer . cc :331)
==14061== by 0xCA0237 : ana lyzer : : tcp : : TCP_Reassembler : : De l i v e r ( unsigned long , in t ,
unsigned char const *) ( TCP_Reassembler . cc :455)
==14061== Address 0xe811168 i s 0 bytes a f t e r a block of s i z e 552 a l l o c ’ d
==14061== at 0x4C2E216 : operator new( unsigned long ) ( vg_replace_mal loc . c :334)
==14061== by 0xBC98D9 : __gnu_cxx : : new_al locator<binpac : : OPCUA : : READ* >:: a l l o c a t e (
unsigned long , void const *) ( new_al locator . h :104)
==14061== by 0xBC932B : s td : : a l l o c a t o r _ t r a i t s <std : : a l l o c a t o r <binpac : : OPCUA : : READ*>
>:: a l l o c a t e ( s td : : a l l o c a t o r <binpac : : OPCUA : : READ*>&, unsigned long ) ( a l l o c _ t r a i t s . h
:491)
==14061== by 0xBC8363 : s td : : _Vector_base<binpac : : OPCUA : : READ* , s td : : a l l o c a t o r <binpac
: : OPCUA : : READ*> >:: _M_al locate ( unsigned long ) ( s t l _ v e c t o r . h :170)
==14061== by 0xBC6407 : binpac : : OPCUA : : READ** s td : : vector<binpac : : OPCUA : : READ* , s td : :
a l l o c a t o r <binpac : : OPCUA : : READ*> >:: _M_allocate_and_copy<std : : move_i terator<binpac : :
OPCUA : : READ**> >(unsigned long , s td : : move_i terator<binpac : : OPCUA : : READ**>, s td : :
move_i terator<binpac : : OPCUA : : READ**>) ( s t l _ v e c t o r . h:1224)
==14061== by 0xBC44AC : s td : : vector<binpac : : OPCUA : : READ* , s td : : a l l o c a t o r <binpac : :
OPCUA : : READ*> >:: re se rve ( unsigned long ) ( vec to r . t c c :75)
==14061== by 0xBB8A33 : binpac : : OPCUA : : ARRAY_OF_READ : : Parse ( unsigned char const * ,
unsigned char const * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :2719)
==14061== by 0xBB8732 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_READ_REQUEST : : Parse ( unsigned char const
* , unsigned char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :2652)
==14061== by 0xBBC6FC : binpac : : OPCUA : : MESSAGE : : Parse ( unsigned char const * , unsigned
char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :4034)
==14061== by 0xBBD138 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_MESSAGE : : Parse ( unsigned char const * ,
unsigned char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :4287)
==14061== by 0xBBD9C7 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_PDU : : Par seBu f f e r ( binpac : : FlowBuffer * ,
binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA*) ( opcua_pac . cc :4494)
==14061== by 0xBBE5C4 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_Flow : : NewData( unsigned char const * ,
unsigned char const *) ( opcua_pac . cc :4726)
==14061==
==14061== I n v a l i d read of s i z e 8
==14061== at 0xBC2220 : binpac : : OPCUA : : read_vec tor ( binpac : : OPCUA : : ARRAY_OF_READ*) (
opcua_pac . cc :5210)
==14061== by 0xBBEFA0 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_Flow : : proc_opcua_read_request ( binpac : :
OPCUA : : OPCUA_READ_REQUEST*) ( opcua_pac . cc :4867)
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==14061== by 0xBB879B : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_READ_REQUEST : : Parse ( unsigned char const
* , unsigned char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :2660)
==14061== by 0xBBC6FC : binpac : : OPCUA : : MESSAGE : : Parse ( unsigned char const * , unsigned
char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :4034)
==14061== by 0xBBD138 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_MESSAGE : : Parse ( unsigned char const * ,
unsigned char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :4287)
==14061== by 0xBBD9C7 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_PDU : : Par seBu f f e r ( binpac : : FlowBuffer * ,
binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA*) ( opcua_pac . cc :4494)
==14061== by 0xBBE5C4 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_Flow : : NewData( unsigned char const * ,
unsigned char const *) ( opcua_pac . cc :4726)
==14061== by 0xBB1FB7 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_Conn : : NewData( bool , unsigned char const
* , unsigned char const *) ( opcua_pac . cc :48)
==14061== by 0xBAFBDC: ana lyzer : : opcua : : OPCUA_Analyzer : : Del iverStream ( int , unsigned
char const * , bool ) (OPCUA. cc :60)
==14061== by 0xD4D0D8: ana lyzer : : Analyzer : : NextStream ( int , unsigned char const * ,
bool ) ( Analyzer . cc :245)
==14061== by 0xD4D542 : ana lyzer : : Analyzer : : ForwardStream ( int , unsigned char const * ,
bool ) ( Analyzer . cc :331)
==14061== by 0xCA0237 : ana lyzer : : tcp : : TCP_Reassembler : : De l i v e r ( unsigned long , in t ,
unsigned char const *) ( TCP_Reassembler . cc :455)
==14061== Address 0xe811188 i s 24 bytes a f t e r a block of s i z e 560 in arena " c l i e n t "
==14061==
==14061== I n v a l i d read of s i z e 8
==14061== at 0xBC32F4 : binpac : : OPCUA : : READ : : node_id () const ( opcua_pac . h:1069)
==14061== by 0xBC0C0C : binpac : : OPCUA : : read ( binpac : : OPCUA : : READ*) ( opcua_pac . cc :5068)
==14061== by 0xBC222A : binpac : : OPCUA : : read_vec tor ( binpac : : OPCUA : : ARRAY_OF_READ*) (
opcua_pac . cc :5210)
==14061== by 0xBBEFA0 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_Flow : : proc_opcua_read_request ( binpac : :
OPCUA : : OPCUA_READ_REQUEST*) ( opcua_pac . cc :4867)
==14061== by 0xBB879B : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_READ_REQUEST : : Parse ( unsigned char const
* , unsigned char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :2660)
==14061== by 0xBBC6FC : binpac : : OPCUA : : MESSAGE : : Parse ( unsigned char const * , unsigned
char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :4034)
==14061== by 0xBBD138 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_MESSAGE : : Parse ( unsigned char const * ,
unsigned char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :4287)
==14061== by 0xBBD9C7 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_PDU : : Par seBu f f e r ( binpac : : FlowBuffer * ,
binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA*) ( opcua_pac . cc :4494)
==14061== by 0xBBE5C4 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_Flow : : NewData( unsigned char const * ,
unsigned char const *) ( opcua_pac . cc :4726)
==14061== by 0xBB1FB7 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_Conn : : NewData( bool , unsigned char const
* , unsigned char const *) ( opcua_pac . cc :48)
==14061== by 0xBAFBDC: ana lyzer : : opcua : : OPCUA_Analyzer : : Del iverStream ( int , unsigned
char const * , bool ) (OPCUA. cc :60)
==14061== by 0xD4D0D8: ana lyzer : : Analyzer : : NextStream ( int , unsigned char const * ,
bool ) ( Analyzer . cc :245)
==14061== Address 0x270 i s not s tack ’ d , malloc ’ d or ( r e c e n t l y ) f ree ’ d
==14061==
==14061==
==14061== Process te rminat ing with d e f a u l t ac t i on of s i g n a l 11 (SIGSEGV)
==14061== Access not with in mapped region at address 0x270
==14061== at 0xBC32F4 : binpac : : OPCUA : : READ : : node_id () const ( opcua_pac . h:1069)
==14061== by 0xBC0C0C : binpac : : OPCUA : : read ( binpac : : OPCUA : : READ*) ( opcua_pac . cc :5068)
==14061== by 0xBC222A : binpac : : OPCUA : : read_vec tor ( binpac : : OPCUA : : ARRAY_OF_READ*) (
opcua_pac . cc :5210)
==14061== by 0xBBEFA0 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_Flow : : proc_opcua_read_request ( binpac : :
OPCUA : : OPCUA_READ_REQUEST*) ( opcua_pac . cc :4867)
==14061== by 0xBB879B : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_READ_REQUEST : : Parse ( unsigned char const
* , unsigned char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :2660)
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==14061== by 0xBBC6FC : binpac : : OPCUA : : MESSAGE : : Parse ( unsigned char const * , unsigned
char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :4034)
==14061== by 0xBBD138 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_MESSAGE : : Parse ( unsigned char const * ,
unsigned char const * , binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA * , i n t ) ( opcua_pac . cc :4287)
==14061== by 0xBBD9C7 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_PDU : : Par seBu f f e r ( binpac : : FlowBuffer * ,
binpac : : OPCUA : : ContextOPCUA*) ( opcua_pac . cc :4494)
==14061== by 0xBBE5C4 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_Flow : : NewData( unsigned char const * ,
unsigned char const *) ( opcua_pac . cc :4726)
==14061== by 0xBB1FB7 : binpac : : OPCUA : : OPCUA_Conn : : NewData( bool , unsigned char const
* , unsigned char const *) ( opcua_pac . cc :48)
==14061== by 0xBAFBDC: ana lyzer : : opcua : : OPCUA_Analyzer : : Del iverStream ( int , unsigned
char const * , bool ) (OPCUA. cc :60)
==14061== by 0xD4D0D8: ana lyzer : : Analyzer : : NextStream ( int , unsigned char const * ,
bool ) ( Analyzer . cc :245)
==14061== I f you b e l i e v e t h i s happened as a r e s u l t of a s t ack
==14061== overf low in your program ’ s main thread ( u n l i k e l y but
==14061== p o s s i b l e ) , you can t r y to inc r ea se the s i z e of the
==14061== main thread s tack using the −−main−s t a c k s i z e= f l a g .
==14061== The main thread s tack s i z e used in t h i s run was 8388608.
==14061==
==14061== HEAP SUMMARY:
==14061== in use at e x i t : 42 ,609 ,541 bytes in 613 ,525 b locks
==14061== t o t a l heap usage : 1 ,413 ,304 a l l o c s , 799 ,779 f ree s , 130 ,921 ,303 bytes
a l l o c a t e d
==14061==
==14061== LEAK SUMMARY:
==14061== d e f i n i t e l y l o s t : 667 ,968 bytes in 34 ,806 b locks
==14061== i n d i r e c t l y l o s t : 10 ,401 ,603 bytes in 144 ,946 b locks
==14061== p o s s i b l y l o s t : 18 ,008 bytes in 278 b locks
==14061== s t i l l reachable : 31 ,521 ,962 bytes in 433 ,495 b locks
==14061== of which reachable v ia h e u r i s t i c :
==14061== m u l t i p l e i n h e r i t a n c e : 128 bytes in 2 b locks
==14061== suppressed : 0 bytes in 0 b locks
==14061== Rerun with −−leak−check=f u l l to see d e t a i l s of leaked memory
==14061==
==14061== For counts of detec ted and suppressed er ror s , rerun with : −v
==14061== Use −−t rack−o r i g i n s=yes to see where u n i n i t i a l i s e d va lues come from
==14061== ERROR SUMMARY: 72 e r r o r s from 4 contex t s ( suppressed : 0 from 0)
Segmentation f a u l t ( core dumped)
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